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Foreword
 I would like to thank the people of Lebanon whom I have met during my journeys, the 
Department of Foreign Languages for giving me this opportunity and the Beirut Exchange 
Program for widening my horizons.
 A note on transliteration: I have chosen to spell words in common usage in the English 
language, such as “Hizbullah” and “Shia” in their commonly used form. Otherwise I use a 
version of the transliteration system of the International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies.
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Map of Lebanon
5
Prologue
! “Terror, violence, conflict, carnage, chaos, cruelty and mayhem are evoked by the 
mere mention of Lebanon. For those who have known Lebanon in better times, and even for 
those of us who have known only a strife-torn country, the fact that Lebanon had become 
synonymous with bloodshed is a source of deep sadness for us. Lebanon, even in the worst of 
times, can be a remarkably seductive place.
 In my judgement, no other Middle Eastern Country, perhaps no country in the world, 
is as enthralling as Lebanon. It's social and political complexity, the keen skills of its citizens 
in dealing with (and manipulating) foreigners, it's lovely climate and splendid food combine 
to imbue on those who have known it- in good times or bad- with a sense of emotional 
attachment that is hard to shake. 
 Lebanon entices and snares even the wary. Though the encounter is often bittersweet, 
it is long savored (...) As the reader has correctly deduced by now, I have not escaped this 
syndrome. I too have succumbed..." 
     A.R.Norton1
 Lebanon has been and continues to be a theatre of regional conflict, dating back to the 
Phoenicians and beyond. Lebanon has been conquered repeatedly. The geography of the 
country, with its snow-peaked mountains and deep green valleys, has enticed countless armies 
to conquer and reconquer. It has been a safe haven, welcoming minorities to seek refuge from 
persecution and death, making the Lebanese population something exquisite in the region and 
decidedly complex. It consists of 18 official sects, all trying to intermingle in the name of 
solidarity and sectarianism, simultaneously.  Similar to Israel’s ‘Jewish Democracy’ 
endeavors, which negate each other, the Lebanese Constitution itself hinders political 
democracy and effectivity, as the domination of one party is plainly impeded. Lebanon will 
continue to be an epicenter of geopolitical conflict as long as foreign powers continue their 
unrelenting ‘war on terror’ in the region. Lebanese nationality only exists on an individual 
6
1 Augustus Richard Norton, Amal and the Shi‛a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon (Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 1987): xiv
consciousness level. The country’s citizens have been reduced to so-called “non-citizens,”2 
letting the elites (of all sects) plunder the states resources. Lebanon is also rising in global 
awareness and media coverage again, and many forces may be pushing towards renewed 
conflict. If so, there will be no winners among the Lebanese, just like there will be no winners 
among the Iraqi, Palestinians or Afghanis, in this ongoing global war.
 No other player within the Lebanese mosaic has risen to such infamy or receives as 
much ambiguous analysis as Hizbullah,3 the ‘Party of God.’ Rising as a resistance guerrilla 
group against Israel, among the poor and neglected Shia in the eighties, the party has 
advanced through substantial political and ideological change to encompass a fully functional 
democratic opposition party in government, a resistance wing, and a social services 
infrastructure rumored to several million dollars a year. Party supporter demographics are 
diverse, ranging from hardcore religious members to non-Shia members voicing their support 
for the resistance against Israel and the West, to the women (Christian, Druze and Sunni) with 
whom the author spoke on the streets of Beirut and Tyre, supporting Nasrallah for his 
expansive social services, hospital networks, garbage collection, electricity generators and 
clean water, without which their standard of living would be greatly reduced.
  The southern parts of Lebanon (al-Junūb) have been subjected to international and 
governmental negligence, bombarded and under threat by a neighboring state, and they 
contain widespread Hizbullah presence. Ever sine the Party of God’s inception, the area has 
seen multiple wars, an ongoing “interim” United Nations (UN) presence, and a multitude of 
factions and parties all vying for support. The area receives literally no social services and 
very little official presence from the central government in Beirut. The majority of the 
infrastructure is from Hizbullah, international aid following conflicts, or UN humanitarian 
aid. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has been in place since 1978, 
with its force size fluctuating from between 2,000 troops to the present 12,000. It offers 
traditional peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, truce observation and conflict de-escalation. 
Being the constant international presence in the South, UNIFIL is a vital player in the future 
of Lebanon.
7
2 Karim Makdisi, "In the Wake of the Doha Truce," Counterpunch, May 17/ 18, 2008, accessed October 5, 2010, 
http://www.counterpunch.org/makdisi05172008.html
3 This transliteration - Hizbullah - will be used throughout this paper. There are other common transliterations: 
Hezbollah, Hizballah, Hezballah, Hisbollah, and Hizb Allah.
 International peacekeeping missions have been forced to undergo extensive 
operational reforms due to the changing contexts of conflict and rules of engagement (ROE) 
since the UN was established in 1948. Opining that these reforms are far from being 
perfected, or even remotely near the realities on the ground of the twenty-first century, is the 
UN Security Council Resolution 17014 implementation in Lebanon solving the problem or 
part of the problem?
 This paper carefully asserts that the Security Council's present, ambiguous Resolution 
1701 is contributing to UNIFIL’s long-term inability to fulfill its mandate. In addition, due to 
inadequate ROE and impossible operational demands on the ground, the mission is 
unsuccessful and futile to all actors involved, both in New York and on the ground. If 
UNIFIL continues to be the traditional peacekeeping force it has been all along, prior to its 
upgrade following the July War (Ḥarb Tammūz) in 2006, it can protect the peace in Southern 
Lebanon without the unrealistic expectations of an extended mandate, which has proven to be 
impossible to implement.5
 The prolonged peace along the Southern borders with Israel during the last four years 
since Ḥarb Tammūz is not “a great success,” as Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Michael 
Williams has stated earlier this year.6 The main argument as to why calm prevails in Lebanon 
today is not because of stability, a lack of craving a new conflict, or a lack of players. The fear 
that the next conflict will escalate out of control to extreme levels of violence causes all to 
await.7 The neoconservative foreign policy towards Lebanon that has been prevalent in the 
past is possibly causing more damage than development. The United States has missed 
several opportunities in the past to engage Hizbullah in dialogue, and these chances keep 
arising, thus suggesting “that between direct diplomatic engagement (...) and direct military 
8
4 United Nations, “SC Resolution 1701,” August 11(2006), accessed August 5, 2010, http://www.un.org/ga/
search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1701%282006%29
5 Eugene Yukin, "Unifil's Mandate and Rules of Engagement," Middle East Policy and Society, Volume 1 
(2009):12, accessed September 12, 2010, http://www.aub.edu.lb/ifi/ifi_saj/Documents/saj2009/
unifil_mandate_rules_of_engagement_yukin.pdf
6 Omayma Abdel-Latif, "Mission Not Impossible," Al-Ahram Weekly On-line, 984 (2010), accessed August 30, 
2010, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2010/984/reg31.htm
7 International Crisis Group, "Drums of War: Israel and The “Axis of Resistance,” Middle East Report No 97
(2010): 1, accessed August 22, 2010, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-syria-
lebanon/lebanon/097-drums-of-war-israel-and-the-axis-of-resistance.aspx
confrontation, a number of other strategies of containment are available to policymakers when 
the statuses of the actors permit containment in the first place.” 8 
	
 This paper proposes that a peaceful resolution to the numerous entangled conflicts 
emanating from within Lebanon may be resolved through engagement with all factions. In 
light of the current situation in Lebanon, it is especially important to involve Hizbullah, who, 
as a heavyweight within Lebanese politics today, will be a vital player in the future of the 
country. Not involving the party in future scenarios, as seen in the Israeli and Palestinian 
negotiations excluding Hamas,9 will most certainly involve renewed violence and the 
continued need for resistance.
 Hizbullah is an ambiguous entity whose ideology and rhetoric are often incoherent 
with previous sentiments, and at times, in complete negation of the other.  There is a need for 
a clearer view of the Resistance, and how it may be an organic part of a solution, not an 
impediment. Hizbullah is a prime example of the transformation process from terrorist group 
to legitimate political participant. This argument is based on the theory that “There is ample 
evidence that participation in an electoral process forces any party, regardless of ideology, to 
moderate its position if it wants to attract voters in large numbers.”10
 As Staten argues, if this is a viable proposal, the decision by a so-called ‘terrorist 
group’ (who, by definition, represents extremist positions) to participate in the legitimate 
political processes can alter a party’s goals. Beyond the expanse of this paper, which basically  
raises more questions than answers, it is very important to “identify and study the factors 
which are conducive to or create not only an opportunity for a terrorist group to become a 
legitimate participant in a relatively open political process but also, over time, to become an 
active and engaged political participant.”11
 The second viable question then could be: Is the continued use of Western democracy 
and peacebuilding tools in Lebanon’s complex environment a realistic solution to the 
Lebanese crisis? The Western rational secular field of peace building is not necessarily 
9
8 Nicholas Noe, "The Relationship between Hizbullah & the United States in Light of the Current Situation in 
the Middle East", MA thesis, University of Cambridge, 2006
9 This is symptomatic of neoconservative foreign policy, mainly US, not engaging parties deemed ‘terrorists’. 
Beyond that, it would be unjustified to compare Hamas and Hizbullah, which are two completely different 
entities regarding political, financial, and military power and scope.
10 Cliff Staten, "From Terrorism to Legitimacy: Political Opportunity Structures and the Case of Hezbollah," The 
Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution, 8,1(2008): 32-49, accessed November 5, 2010, 
www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/8_1staten.pdf
11 Ibid.
applicable in the Islamic theological and spiritual traditions of Islamic peace building. Like 
their religious counterparts, Islamic scholars must deal with how violence is associated with 
the faith tradition and how contemporary politics shape the debate on Islam.12 The most 
common trap into which Western peacemakers enter is to introduce Western conflict 
resolution theories in a region distrustful of both them and the theories. Most of these areas 
are previous colonies, and the distrust of the West’s intentions may manifest itself in 
resistance. Islamic leaders deal with conflict resolution theories daily within Madrases and 
mosques all over the world. Negotiation, reconciliation and dialogue between families and 
tribes are all based on faith-related theories. Can Western peace and conflict resolution tools 
be altered in these regions by also using Islamic conflict resolution tools? The answer to this 
falls outside the scope of this paper, although it is a necessary question to ask if peacebuilding 
in the region is to be revamped and brought out of the neoconservative rhetoric that has 
prevailed since September 11, 2001, and failed so utterly.13
 Hizbullah’s polemic remains Islamic in ideology, but the polemics of the party politics 
contribute to the overall democratic political milieu. Looking at Hizbullah’s aspirations to 
build a democratic state structure inevitably contributes to the party’s democratic actions. 
Democratic state-building and peacebuilding missions are easily confused; the one involves 
building a solid structure on a stable foundation of human resources and economic 
development, whereas the other focuses mainly on human security. Weak Third World states 
recently emerging from violent conflict cannot be coerced into democratic elections. 
Unwavering U.S. support of pro-Western parties in the name of democracy have proven this. 
The so-called democratic Western designed systems do not promote equality, fair 
representation or justice in a country with absolutely no democratic collective mentality. 
Albeit, many parties promote the desire to reform and redesign the political system, but none 
as clearly as Hizbullah. 
 This study attempts to examine selected Hizbullah rhetoric concerning future 
peacebuilding and state-building within Lebanon.  Hizbullah’s leader Sayyid Hassan 
Nasrallah, following the end of the Israeli occupation in 2000, the 2006 July War, and the 
subsequent enhancement of UNFIL and current developments in the South, frequently hints at 
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12 Qamar ul-Huda, "Enhancing Skills and Capacity Building in Islamic Peacebuilding." in Crescent and Dove: 
Peace and Conflict Resolution in Islam, ed. Qamar ul-Huda, (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 
2010) 206-207
13 Gerard Baker, "The Neocons Have Been Routed. But They Are Not All Wrong," The Sunday Times, April 13, 
2007, accessed October 5, 2010, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/article1647410.ece
the possibilities of a peaceful solution in relation to UNIFIL, UN Security Council 
Resolutions 1559 and 1701, and foreign policy intervention. Hizbullah’s ‘changing face of 
terrorism’14 will become evident, as well as international pressure on the Lebanese 
government to force the party to disarm. Looking at these few selected sources, perhaps one 
can see the outlines of a viable foreign policy to integrate the Resistance into the army, while 
Hizbullah can continue being the political party it is today. On the other hand, building a state 
based on national unity, sovereignty and state institutions that cover all regions is far from the 
current reality. Would Nasrallah let the government take over vital areas of social services if 
they were capable? If the state takes out the garbage and builds schools, would this loss of 
power bring more resistance, or would the Hizbullah institutions merge with the public 
sector? 
 Nasrallah has said that “A peaceful resolution is a victory for the resistance.”15 
As a double-edged sword, intervention in Lebanon is inevitable. The issue of Iran’s weapons, 
the Palestinians and the ‘war on terror’ has not succeeded, nor has the U.S. policy become any 
more transcending or imaginative when dealing with the country’s foes. 
 It is probable to believe, after considering the general environment within Lebanon, 
that a conflict is plausible in the near future. In the name of humanity, one should always 
search for the solution that avoids extensive loss of life. How long this present front can hold 
is on what everyone is betting, but for the Lebanese Shia in the South and the Israelis in the 
North, the situation is deteriorating.
 Primary sources are selected speeches by the Secretary General of Hizbullah, Sayyid 
Hassan Nasrallah, from Arabic, all of which concern the party’s stance on state-building, 
UNFIL and/or UN and foreign intervention in Lebanon. These are supported by 
commentaries, articles and interviews from within the political sphere in Lebanon, in addition 
to information from three trips to the field in May 2007, July 2009 and June 2010, 
respectively. Endeavoring to understand a little more from the ground up implies traveling 
and experiencing the realities on the ground.  These short visits have been limited in time and 
scope, and even though they have ignited the passion for the region of which Norton speaks, 
they have also eased the language and cultural barriers. In addition, they have fueled the 
11
14Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism, Second ed. (London: I.B. Tauris and 
Co.Ltd., 2005)
15 Nicholas Noe Ed, Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, Trans. Ellen Khouri 
(London: Verso, 2007), 220
enthusiasm and curiosity that is essential if one is to attempt a study of Ḥizb Allāh. It is 
rumored that if an individual ever thinks he understands Lebanese politics, then he has not 
been explained it properly. This paper reinforces that belief.
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I.  !"و$%" Resistance
 
 !"# $%&'#او مو&+,ا ب./01# ع&+3#او ل&561# 7879#ا !301# ,:3;3<#ا :;=>ا :5?&9#ا توA;3#  ,تا.B>او ة.BDا &E8ا
 &/F3<% A8A<F#او :%و&+,ا $;G HI J"# ن&/3# HI :LIو :G&5M !"# ن&/3# HI :NO&Pو ب7Q !"# ,ن&/3# HI :8ARو ة$1=
 S1G رد&+#ا V;/,ا لد&9#ا 7879#ا ى.+#ا ن&/3# ء&/3# نو&9F1# &%ود ةAY&<#ا ةدو$5,ا &Z$8و &/%اAFQاو &ZA8$+[و
 .\[&]A=و ^ا :5Qرو J";1G م_`#او هزرأ د.1d= $#&d#ا \#&3M خ.56= f%&6#ا د.5'#ا
“ O Brothers and Sisters, to Beirut, our proud and beloved capital, to the 
mighty mountain, to the North and the Bekaa, to the South resistant and 
steadfast, to each town and village in Lebanon, each party and sect in Lebanon, 
to each group and faction in Lebanon, to you in the festival of Resistance and 
Liberation, we extend our love, appreciation, our respect and our outstretched 
hand that is always ready for cooperation to build a strong, mighty, just, 
invincible Lebanon capable of steadfastness and standing tall as its mountains 
stand tall, eternal as its cedars are eternal. Peace be with you, and the mercy 
and blessings of God.16     
" The Lebanese State gained its independence in 1943. The colonial power of France 
divided the areas of Lebanon and Syria, enlarging the mainly Christian area of Mount 
Lebanon to encompass more Muslims, including Druze, and established the unwritten 
National Pact (al-Mīthāq al-Watanī), the political system in Lebanon built on a unique 
political system of confessionalism, political sectarianism or power sharing among sects (al-
ṭāʾifiyya al-siyāsiyya).  The (supposedly) largest sect controls the most important positions in 
government, and political seats are appointed to several minorities according to demographic 
proportions. In the Lebanese case, the Mīthāq has stated that the ratio for members of 
parliament was 6-to-5 of Christian to Muslim, which was later ratified to 50/50 in 1990, while 
the top three positions were delegated along sectarian lines: the President being a Maronite 
Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim and the Speaker of the House of 
13
16 Muhammed Abdullah, "ىAg_# A8A<F= رh38و ن&5;1g ب&id= jQA8 ^اA'Z $;`#ا"
Al-Manar TV, 26 May, 2008, accessed November 1, 2010, http://www.almanar.com.lb/NewsSite/
NewsDetails.aspx?id=44512&language=ar
Representatives a Shiite Muslim.  Political parties do not actually exist in the Lebanese 
political arena; rather, political blocs are based on confessional and local interests or family/
religious allegiances. Private personal matters such as rules of marriage, divorce and 
inheritance are under the jurisdiction of religious courts for each sect. Efforts to abolish or 
alter the political system have been at the centre of Lebanese political discourse for decades. 
Those favored by the 1943 Mīthāq wish to preserve it, whereas those marginalized by it wish 
to ratify it with new key demographic data or abolish it entirely. The Ṭāʾif Agreement in 1989 
further codified sectarianism, making it the pivotal centre of Lebanese political life, despite its 
endeavors to further commitment in abolishing the confessionalist system in the future.
  This political status quo, intended to promote fairness in a complex sectarian 
environment, has created even greater segregation across the social spectrum. The lack of 
regular interaction has resulted in even greater feelings of injustice. Much discontent has thus 
slowly been evolving, as the Muslim population (both Shiite and Sunni) has become a much 
larger demographic proportion than at the time of the last consensus taken in 1932. The 
secularized sectarian government has failed to receive ample support among the growing 
Shiite communities and failed to care for their needs and failed to redistribute power to better 
match the Muslim majority in Lebanon. Conditions in Southern Lebanon deteriorated, many 
Shiites lost their homes and livelihoods during Israeli incursions, becoming refugees and 
being forced to flee to major cities, and the Lebanese central government continuously 
neglected the South both financially and in creating public awareness. The growing number of 
Palestinian refugees in the South added to the volatile and fragile political environment.
 As the 1967 Arab-Israeli war passed, the 1970s saw a strong global resurgence to a 
more politicized, traditional Islam: an Islam that would cover all aspects of life, from national 
identity, to state governance, to homemaking. Its most extreme is what the West has termed 
“Islamic fundamentalism.”17 A new group of religious clerics emerged on the scene in 
Lebanon, the majority of whom were educated at the al-Najaf religious seminary in Iraq. They 
attracted young Shiite men, radical thinkers, the poor and uneducated, forming religious 
congregations based in Southern Lebanon, the Bekaa valley and in the suburbs of Beirut (al-
ḍāḥiya). These groups were all concerned with Islam’s role in life, as opposed to the much 
more secular, cultural and political scene in Lebanon at the time. 
14
17 Harik, Hezbollah, 9
The Party of God’s Inception and Ideology
" Five major events radicalized Shiite politics in Lebanon after the 1960s: the Lebanese 
Civil War (1975-89), Imam Musa al-Sadr’s disappearance in 1978, the Iranian Revolution in 
1978-79 and the Israeli invasions of 1978 and 1982.
 Imam Musa Sadr, a religious scholar whose activities originated in Ṣūr (Tyre) in 
Southern Lebanon and radiated to the suburbs of Beirut, received immense popularity and 
success. His extremely charismatic personality, complemented with a sound sense of logic, 
roused massive support. Sadr was a prominent figure, and at his disappearance in 1978, quite 
a cult hero. He had created a sociopolitical movement, which culminated in 1967 in the 
creation of the High Islamic Shiite Council. These movements were in opposition to the main 
Shiite politicians who preached moderation and multi- confessionalism. The Cuban resistance 
leader Che Guevara described the guerrilla as “a crusader for the people’s freedom who, after 
exhaustive peaceful means, resorts to armed rebellion.  He aims directly at destroying an 
unjust social order and indirectly replacing it with something new.”18 Unfortunately, the need 
for an equivalent force to look after the concerns of the Shi‛ites in Lebanon arose, and Sadr 
founded the “Movement of the Oppressed,” which also included a resistance wing: ‘The 
Ranks of Lebanese Resistance’ acronym AMAL (afwāj al-muqāwama al-lubnāniyya), whose 
main objective was to resist Israeli occupation. The Maronite Christian and Sunni-dominated 
government was a main obstacle in Sadr’s endeavors to secure Shiite rights and securities. 
Sadr’s disappearance during a trip to visit Qaddafi in Libya breathed new life into AMAL. 
However, by 1982, Sadr’s successor Nabih Berri had pursued a more moderate, pragmatic 
policy, maintaining relations with Lebanon’s Christian-dominated government and Western 
powers. Quite quickly, a faction within AMAL separated.
 After the Israeli invasion of 1982 and the massacres in the Palestinian refugee camps 
of Sabra and Shatiila, the Shia of Lebanon began leaning towards a pure Islamic resistance. It 
was evident that none of the existing Islamic factional frameworks were adequate for the 
situation.  A manifesto was drafted and signed by representatives of the main Islamic groups, 
including AMAL and the clerical congregations in the Bekaa Valley. The Iranian Revolution 
had summoned massive support in Lebanon under the banner of “Supportive Committees to 
15
18 James B Love, "Hezbollah: Social Services as a Source of Power,” Joint Special Operations University, 
Report 10-5, June 2010, accessed November 20, 2010, www.paxtu.org/html/recent_pubs.htm
the Islamic Revolution in Iran.” Thus, the head of the Islamic community (Umma) in Iran, 
Ayatollah Khomeini, the Jurist-Guardian (al-walī al-faqīh), became the legitimate leader for 
the organization Hizbullah (Ḥizb Allāh), as it was named, and became directly linked to its 
resistance wing. Hizbullah’s motto: “The party of God will surely be the victors” was taken 
from the Qur’an: “Now surely it is The Party of Allāh who are the Successful!” (al-
mufliḥūn).19 This opposed the “Party of the Evil One”, who will lose, whether it be Christian 
militias, Israeli forces, Western Imperialism, or even AMAL.
 Shiite identity in Lebanon is thus heavily dependent on with whom one affiliates. The 
Shiite identity and beliefs are based on their history of suffering and that they deserve a more 
privileged position in the state, that they are the most loyal Lebanese citizens and not a 
majority in any Arab country, and that Arabic is their national language. While de facto, both 
AMAL and Hizbullah consider Christians as people of the book (ahl al-kitab) to be protected 
under Sharīʿa, they define sectarian relations differently. AMAL supporters, following Sadr’s 
example, view Islam and Christianity as two equal world religions, each thus safeguarding the 
other in their interpretation. Neither group should be politically and socially sidelined without 
justification. Hizbullah views Islam as superior, and Christians’ rights as citizens being 
defined through Sharīʿa; thus, they will be marginalized both politically and socially. 
 “ AMAL and Hezbollah have represented quite different applications of Shiite identity and 
belief in Lebanon.”20 Hizbullah more rigorously espoused an Islamic-based identity and 
ideology, opposed to AMAL, who increasingly became multiconfessional and represented a 
pluralistic, lay-dominated organization.
 The majority of Shia in Lebanon are called “Twelvers” (ithnā ʿasharī), who agree on 
there being Twelve Imams, the last one hidden by God and who will return in a messianic 
form (Mahdī). This Imam is considered the rightful successor to the Prophet. The martyred 
Imam Husayn fits nicely into the cultures of martyrdom and ‘jihād’ needed during the Iranian 
Revolution and in Lebanon at the time. Iran saw two foreign policy goals in its connections 
and support to Hizbullah: fight Israel through a proxy with direct access to the Arab/Israeli 
conflict, and to expand Shiite Islam. Thus, “Many have questioned Hezbollah’s loyalty to the 
Lebanese nation because of the dense transnational ties on various levels that it maintains 
16
19 The Holy Quran (58:22)
20  John L. Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path, Exp. Second Ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 186
with Iran.”21 The party continues to receive substantial funding by the religious elite in Iran. 
During the 1982 Israeli invasion, Iran was the only country that sent troops to assist. When 
the conflict did not escalate regionally, the Iranian troops departed, “...leaving behind a few 
Revolutionary Guards” sent to the Beqaa Valley, to provide support, training and moral 
motivation for Lebanon’s confrontation with Israel.22 Iran financed the advanced organization 
of Hizbullah military training, gave financial aid and salaries to the men and their families, 
and financed religious/social activities. At one point, Iran was the largest employer in 
Lebanon. Based in the Beqaa Valley, by the ancient ruins of Baʿalbak, this new order was 
extremely active in the border areas. Young Shiite men, clergy and students were in social 
decline here. Their situation justified Hizbullah’s interpretation of a religious, personal and 
political struggle (jihād) from political oppression, imperialism, social injustice and 
martyrdom (istishhād).23 It is important to stress that even though the funding and inspiration 
was Iranian, Hizbullah has been Lebanese since its inception. This culture of jihād, 
martyrdom and active resistance against Zionism is absent in AMAL’s nationalism. 
Hizbullah’s vision for Lebanon’s political identity overlaps with AMAL on several areas, but 
it differs most importantly on its view of secularism, which Hizbullah considers a weakness 
and lack of faith in God. Hizbullah represents the disempowered/downtrodden (al-
mustaḍʿafūn) in opposition to the immoral rich. Thus, they must break the Sunni and 
Maronite hegemony over the nation. 
" In short, Hizbullah’s three pivotal foundations are: First, Islam as the foundation for a 
better life; religiously, intellectually, ideologically and practically. Second is the: 
“Resistance against Israeli occupation, which is a danger to both the present 
and future, receives ultimate confrontation priority given the anticipated effects 
of such occupation on Lebanon and the region. This necessitates the creation 
of a jihad (holy war) structure that should further this obligation, and in favor 
of which all capabilities are to be employed.”24 
17
21 Roschanack Shaery-Eisenlohr, Shi'ite Lebanon: Transnational Religion and the Making of National Identities 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 37
22 Noe, Voice of Hezbollah, 224
23 Harik, Hezbollah, 39
24 Naim Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from Within, Trans. Dalia Khalil (London: Saqi, 2005), 19
This is later seen as a general condemnation of the West. The third foundation is the 
legitimate leadership by the Jurist-Guardian in Iran.25 
 The 1985 Open Letter presented by Hizbullah’s head at the time, and later printed as 
an open letter to the downtrodden in Lebanon in the Al-Akhbar newspaper, was the first 
Islamic ideological foundation of the Party of God. This original Hizbullah Manifesto reflects 
various views by the founders, as well as the political thinking of senior Shia cleric 
Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah. Some in al-Ḍāḥiya still call the late Fadlallah ‘the father of 
Hizbullah,’ not for his active party involvement, which has never existed according to 
Hizbullah sources (his name on the U.S. terrorism list notwithstanding), but for his public 
speeches and sermons that inspired a generation of Resistance fighters in Lebanon and the 
region and continue to do so.
 Indeed, the introduction of the Open Letter can easily be used to smear the party as 
religious fanatics and as appearing too ‘foreign’ and too Iranian:
We are often asked: Who are we, the Hezbollah, and what is our identity? We 
are the sons of the umma (Muslim community) - the party of God (Hizb Allah) 
the vanguard of which was made victorious by God in Iran. There the 
vanguard succeeded to lay down the bases of a Muslim state which plays a 
central role in the world. We obey the orders of one leader, wise and just, that 
of our tutor and Faqih (jurist) who fulfills all the necessary conditions: 
Ruhollah Musawi Khomeini. God save him! (...) By virtue of the above, we do 
not constitute an organized and closed party in Lebanon. Nor are we a tight 
political cadre. We are an umma linked to the Muslims of the whole World by 
the solid doctrinal and religious connection of Islam, whose message God 
wanted to be fulfilled by the Seal of the Prophets, i.e., Muhammad. This is why 
whatever touches or strikes the Muslims in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines 
and elsewhere reverberates throughout the whole Muslim umma of which we 
are an integral part. Our behavior is dictated to us by legal principles laid 
down by the light of an overall political conception defined by the leading 
jurist (wilayat al-faqih). As for our culture, it is based on the Holy Koran, the 
Sunna and the legal rulings of the faqih who is our source of imitation (marja' 
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al-taqlid). Our culture is crystal clear. It is not complicated and is accessible to 
all.26
It should be emphasized that none of Hizbullah's websites have published the full text of the 
letter, preferring to publish the 1996 electoral program, which was intended for the specific 
propaganda campaign, before the Lebanese parliamentary elections in 1996.
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United Nations Peacekeeping
 Peace support operations include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacebuilding, 
peace enforcement and humanitarian operations. The spectrum from peacekeeping to war is 
thus:27
Peacekeeping
↓
(loss of consent)
↓
Peace Enforcement
↓
(loss of impartiality)
↓
War
 The role that peacekeeping plays in global politics is important to understanding the 
nature of peacekeeping. Three key points emerge: first, in political discourse, peacekeeping 
involves many types of operations, secondly, peacekeeping operations perform different tasks 
simultaneously, so boundaries between different tasks may be unhelpful (or even destructive, 
as in UNIFIL’s case), and lastly, peacekeeping operations change over time. Early 
peacekeeping history can be linked to three ideas that have developed along with the society 
of states: The first is that great powers have the special responsibility of maintaining 
international peace and security. Second, the UN’s new role in collective security and 
preventive diplomacy, and third, early peacekeeping was influenced by the growing 
importance of humanitarian concerns in international society.28 The ‘holy trinity of traditional 
peacekeeping,’ which are consent, impartiality and minimum use of force, are widely 
accepted today as crucial to peacekeeping, although quite restricted. “It is neither proactive as 
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a creative force in wider conflict-resolution processes, nor as a coercive instrument in defence 
of such processes.”29
 As the Cold War deepened in the 1950s, the UN had an opportunity to expand its role 
in international conflict resolution in the complex Suez Crisis. The UN Emergency Force sent 
to the Sinai in 1956 produced a set of peacekeeping concepts that remain influential today. It 
was the first practical demonstration of the UN’s worth in such situations as a neutral third 
party. Prior to the Suez Crisis, the UN experiences had been limited to observer missions, 
attempting to monitor a situation with the consent of the concerned parties. The organization 
was usually deployed in periods after a ceasefire agreement to provide an impartial 
international presence until a political settlement was reached. During the Cold War, it was 
difficult for the UN to play its role in collective security. “Although the architects of the UN 
Charter had envisioned a powerful institution capable of enforcing collective security, the 
rapid deterioration of relations between it’s two most influential superpower members, the US 
and USSR, created lack of consensus in the Security Council.”30
 The second generation of peacekeeping was characterized by the transition 
peacekeeping forces being deployed to areas where there is no peace to be kept.  A lack of 
consent exists from one or all parties and frequent, ongoing violence. The weaknesses 
experienced in wider peacekeeping imply that ‘peace enforcement’ and ‘peace support 
operations’ may be necessary to accomplish the expanded mandates. It is said that the strict 
adhesion to the ‘holy trinity’ restricts imaginative thinking in the problems of consent.31 
Furthermore, impartiality is an issue, as it has been loosely synonymous with neutrality, 
although it idealistically treats all parties equally in relation to their adherence to the mandate.
 Hailing the oncoming media age, television images of conflict areas, hunger and war 
could be seen in every home after the Cold War, resulting in a drastic increase in member 
countries’ contributions. Peacekeeping became interventionist, large-scale and with 
considerable, often pressing humanitarian claims. These transitions to a new peace-building 
modus operandi stretched into the nineties all over the globe and whose mandate did not 
demand consent from all parties. The complex emergencies the UN faced exploded.  These 
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demanded a well-trained, disciplined, effective military force, if those intervening were not to 
become a part of the problem.
 Vera Hayes’ essay states that the difficulty of deploying troops on peacekeeping 
missions to areas where there is no true peace to keep needs to be addressed. The classic 
peacekeeping missions are very unlikely to occur, for they imply consent on all levels in post-
interstate conflict. Rather, in increasingly common intrastate conflicts, not all parties can be 
expected to accept an accord or abide to one. A coercive peace enforcement force would be 
necessary.32 However, this theory has proven to be flawed, as one can see in the history of 
UNIFIL.
 In March, 1978, al-Fatah guerrillas kidnapped a civilian bus on a highway close to Tel 
Aviv, resulting in 34 Israelis being killed. Israel followed by invading the entire Southern 
Lebanon, except the town of Tyre and surrounding areas. “Operation Litani” was launched by 
the current Prime Minister to be rid of “the arm of evil” (the PLO).33 The UNSC, greatly 
persuaded by U.S. interests in the region, passed Resolutions 425 and 426 for the immediate 
withdrawal of Israeli troops and the establishment of UNIFIL. It had three initial objectives: 
to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces, to restore international peace and security, and 
lastly, to assist the Lebanese government to ensure the return of its effective authority.34 Israel 
invaded Lebanon again in 1982, reaching Beirut. For three years, UNIFIL existed behind 
Israeli lines, with limited capabilities beyond immediate protection and humanitarian aid. A 
partial withdrawal was begun in 1985, with a large area to be controlled by the Israel Defence 
Forces (IDF) and the Southern Lebanese Army, Israel’s on-the-ground proxy. The Security 
Council pressed for Lebanese territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence. The 
Lebanese government also demanded complete Israeli withdrawal, not according to UN 
Resolution 425. In the pressed situation, UNIFIL was unable to carry out its mandate, which 
was extended by request of the Security General and the Lebanese government on a regular 
basis. 
 Hizbullah’s party program, the Open Letter, came in 1985. Its rhetoric regarding 
international meddling in Lebanon was absolute and violent. It rejects both the USSR and the 
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US, both Capitalism and Communism, for both are incapable of laying the foundations for a 
just society. International forces were deployed to Muslim territories to form a security barrier 
obstructing the Resistance Movement and protecting Israel, according to Hizbullah, they will 
not follow the commitments to imposed Phalangists regime, and “other countries must think 
carefully before they get immersed in the swamp in which Israel has drowned.”35
 
  Although the rhetoric has been modified over the following 25 years, Naim 
Qassam, Deputy Secretary General to Hizbullah, reiterated in 2007, during the formation of 
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, that meddling would lead to internal conflict and the UN 
Security Council should remain neutral if they want a state of Lebanon.36
 UNIFIL “is a notorious example”37 of what happens when a traditional peacekeeping 
operation is only partially accepted by the warring factions and does not fully honor its 
mandate. Thus, one of the main reasons this mission was so unsuccessful is the incoherence 
between the ROE and initial mandate given to UNIFIL. The initial classical peacekeeping 
mission was supposed to have the consent of all warring parties, which was impossible in 
Lebanon during the civil war, “a peacekeepers nightmare.”38 The lightly armed peacekeeping 
mission came to manage conflict and supervise the truce. UNIFIL was unsuccessful, if its 
mandate was to be taken seriously, as it was not present in the 1982 Israeli invasion, or in the 
July War (Harb al-Tammūz) in 2006. 
 The original mandate of 1978 had a broad focus on civilian outreach programs in the 
South. This success was mainly due to operational practicalities as simple as troops living 
within the villages, resulting in closer ties to village leaders and more daily contact with the 
locals. Despite these efforts to win the hearts and minds of the South, which continues to this 
day as a major goal, UNIFL was no match for the Party of God.
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Hizbullah Winning Hearts and Minds
 The West’s focus on Hizbullah is mainly on its guerilla activities, but the party owes 
much of its growth and achievements to its performance in the social arena. Hizbullah is often 
termed a “state within a state,” although author and journalist Cambanis puts it more 
succinctly by stating that it is a “state surrounded by the ruins of another, the failed state of 
Lebanon.”39  Lebanon has its own standing army, the Lebanese Armed Forces, and Ministry 
of Defense, and still Hizbullah has repeatedly been able to initiate and fight wars 
independently, engulfing the entire country in conflict. Hizbullah’s international baptism 
followed the aforementioned atrocities in the refugee camps in 1982. The United States 
seemed downright embarrassed about how they could let the tragic event occur. Therefore, 
they sent in the Marines, part of a multinational force (MNF). They only lasted two years, as 
the hard facts of occupation resulted in serious casualties followed by violent retributions on 
both sides. The bombing of the U.S. Embassy, killing 66, and the Beirut barracks bombings in 
1983, which killed 299 American and French servicemen, forced the MNF to withdraw. These 
major attacks were claimed by the Islamic Jihad Organization. The United States has accused 
it as being a nom de guerre of Hizbullah, although the party has never claimed responsibility, 
but rather denied involvement.
 In lead with its international war on terrorism, the United States has renewed its 
terrorist charges, stating that “Hizbullah remains the most technically capable terrorist group 
in the world,”40 and the country is trying to shut the group down. This contradictory view on a 
popular, moderate, mainstream, political party in an upcoming national state creates an 
incredible widening blockage to a future dialogue, which has direct influence on UN Security 
Council rhetoric. Consequently, current foreign policy toward Hizbullah “is not driven by an 
effort to halt terrorist attacks against the Israelis as purported, but rather an attempt by the 
American administration to settle old scores and relieve pressure on its ally...”41
 Looking at Hizbullah’s activities in Lebanon provides a more nuanced view of such a 
complicated entity, its evolution and its deliberate implementation of strategies to alter this 
stamp of terrorism: 
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 Not one aspect of aiding the poor was neglected as the Party worked towards 
 achieving joint social responsibility, answering to urgent needs and introducing 
 beneficial programs.42
 Hizbullah understood early the importance of offering social and public services to its 
supporters. The creation of independently run organizations within education, culture, health, 
media, agriculture, construction and other domains, all complied with the party’s general 
goals and guidelines.43 Participation in various societies and circles required different levels 
of direct party participation, but public social services were open to a broader public. 
Hizbullah was based on an organizational framework specially designed to maintain a 
hierarchical pyramid structure, taking into account the diverse society of Lebanon. The 
intention was to encompass the fundamental believers honoring the party’s goals, while at the 
same time honoring and maintaining intersegmental differences. Hizbullah’s capacity to fight 
Israel is dependent on a positive relationship with the state and broad public support. The 
scope of these programs makes Hizbullah a unique case among Lebanese political parties and 
other Islamic organizations in the region. It is said that Hizbullah’s social and health programs 
are worth hundreds of millions of dollars annually.44 
 During periods of conflict and war, militia leaders have been forced to create mini-
public administrations in their areas of control, taking charge of essential tasks such as 
electricity, water, education, and road repairs. Hizbullah differed from the other militias in 
that it was funded from abroad. They were not exploiting the declining Lebanese government 
during the civil war, like their Shiite rival AMAL did.  
 The major areas in social welfare were:
• Distribution of water to tanks across al-Ḍāḥiya, making drinking water available on a daily 
basis to 15,000 families. This service has been in effect since 1990 until today and is still 
the major source of water for al-Ḍāḥiya  residents.45 This also includes the laying of pipes 
and use of generators in power outages to pump water from cisterns. This is of acute 
importance in periods of conflict. Water resources in Lebanon are a constant predicament. 
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The fact that this was all financed by a foreign country and undertaken by a political party, 
and the fact that the Lebanese government never assumed this duty, leaves no doubt that the 
government has no intention of removing Hizbullah’s public services to undercut political 
appeal. Harik, a long-term Beirut resident and Hizbullah scholar, asserts that they have, in 
fact, done the government a favor, avoiding a great social disruption in al-Ḍāḥiya , as those 
wishing to accuse the government of sectarian discrimination have only to mention that the 
non-Shiite areas have a constant flow of clean water.46
• Health services include several fixed and mobile infirmaries in the South and healthcare 
centers, including the large Iranian-backed hospital al-Rasul al-Azam Hospital/Mosque, 
based in al-Ḍāḥiya . Hizbullah fighters and civilians wounded due to conflict have all their 
medical bills paid there, but the hospital is also widely used by the locals of all sects. The 
prices are low, and the health services modern and clean. Since there are no public hospitals 
in the area, the importance of such an Islamic institution cannot be overestimated.47 
Although some of the more secular in the Shiite community find Hizbullah a little too 
“straitlaced,” for example, the mandatory use of headscarves to enter the hospital, the 
meeting of material needs might override these feelings and encourage political loyalty after 
all. This includes medical professionals in particular, thousands of whom depend on 
Hizbullah for their livelihood and are loyal supporters.
• Waste removal from the al-Ḍāḥiya. The suburbs have been growing quickly due to mass 
urbanization since the sixties by rural Shiites. Averaging 65 tons a day, solved the problem 
of government neglect and environmental preservation. This service was also free of charge.
• Rebuilding homes, shops and public structures, due mainly to Israeli bombing or, in the 
northern Beqaa Valley, torrential rain flooding. The Association for Construction and 
Development (Jihād al- Binā) was founded less than three years after the party’s creation.  
They are a major force in Lebanon, responsible for large housing projects for which the 
government should have been responsible. They also equip schools in al-Ḍāḥiya and the 
South with sanitation facilities, drinking fountains, desks and lights.
• Active networking and dialogue with different sects, especially Christians. Arranging open 
discussion forums, lunches and other catered events and agricultural networks for farmers 
and offering professional guidance and staff.
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 Iranian influence and relations to the party question its national loyalty and local 
authenticity, in a party seemingly bought and paid for by a foreign power. The recent visit by 
Iranian President Ahmadinejad shows growing sympathies (possibly bought and paid for as 
well). Hizbullah has often tried to refrain from practices damaging to Islam’s reputation and 
gained them good will from secular Shiite and non-Shiite Lebanese. An illustrative example 
worth mentioning is Hizbullah members’ refrain from hitting haydar. This ritual of self-
flagellation is to commemorate and mourn the death of Imam Husayn (d.680), the grandson of 
the prophet Muhammad, on the tenth day of Muharram (yaum ‘ashūra) and the battle of 
Karbala. It involves cutting the skin of the forehead with knives and swords and beating the 
wound continuously while crying out “Ḥaydar,”one of the names of Imam Ali, the father of 
Imam Husayn.’ They wear white kafans that quickly become stained with blood. This 
commemoration is a Shiite ritual, based in Nabatiyya in Southern Lebanon.  Up to five 
thousand men have participated and 150,000 people attended the festivities. It became a very 
important economic factor for the locals and grew in popularity in the 1970s. A clash between 
Israeli soldiers and ‘Ashūra commemorators in 1983 politicized the practice, and the ritual 
practice became a stage for the newly created Hizbullah to attract followers. AMAL and 
Hizbullah began to stage separate processions, and participators wore headbands or scarves to 
show their affiliation. In 1994, the Iranian supreme spiritual leader, Khamenei issued a fatwa 
that demanded a stop to self-flagellation among Shiites worldwide, encouraging blood 
donation instead. Hizbullah stopped their practices. Khomeini issued a similar opinion before 
his death in 1989, of a correct and authentic form of commemoration, so the fatwa was not 
difficult to pass. Many Shiite leaders, including Fadlallah, have discouraged the ritual and 
questioned whether self-flagellation is the proper way to commemorate Imam Husayn or if 
that was how he would have liked his martyrdom remembered and if it is an effective practice 
of spiritual intercession. AMAL does not consider Ayatollah ‘Ali Khamenei their marjaʿ and 
continued the ritual. They saw in the continuation of the practice their independence from 
Iranian dominance over Shiite affairs in Lebanon.48 In addition, they were the bearers of local 
traditions, opposed to the foreign influenced Hizbullah. Violent clashes were staged in 
Nabatiyya between the two groups. AMAL presented Hizbullah’s submission to the fatwa as 
proof of their ties to Iran. In the late 1990s, Iranian-AMAL relations improved and AMAL 
officially dissociated itself from the ritual, claiming intellectually that it was also a foreign 
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imported tradition not rooted in Lebanon.  The Red Cross and hospitals in the South and 
Beirut certainly welcomed blood donation and literally shut their doors to patients suffering 
wounds from haydar.
 This ritual performance is thus intimately related to interpretations of Lebanese 
nationalism, asking what is local tradition versus what is inauthentic innovation imported by 
foreigners.49 Nevertheless, refraining from a practice that has caused such outcries on Shiite 
backwardness from non-Shiites in Lebanon might be viewed as one of the most successful 
strategies to positioning itself as a respectable, rational and capable player in the Lebanese 
nation and in the running of the country.
 The Palestinians in Lebanon are a constant factor intermingled with the future of the 
ciuntry, at the same degree of urgency as Lebanese governmental sovereignty, the anticipated 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon indictment and the Hizbullah arms conundrum. Lebanon hosts 
more than 380,000 refugees,50 who are still “living in cages”,51 victim to alienation from civil, 
political and cultural society. The majority live within 13 official camps, built for an original 
50,000 inhabitants. The UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), established specifically to 
cater to Palestinian refugees, assists with very limited humanitarian aid, and is responsible for 
the cleaning and maintenance services in the camps and, for example, rebuilding the Nahr al-
Bared refugee camp in Tripoli, north of Beirut in 2008.52 Financing is always the major 
hurdle, with individual projects often rising and falling on the random goodwill of donor 
states. Being born in exile, forced to move from camp to camp, and subject to violence and 
repression, the once large and politically powerful community is almost completely 
fragmented. They are labeled foreigners, with limited rights to documents and papers and 
limited access to the workforce.
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 The official Lebanese stance is the recurrent mantra uttered by Rafiq al-Hariri in 1998 
that “Lebanon will never, ever integrate Palestinians.  They will not receive civic or economic 
rights or even work permits. Integration would take the Palestinians off the shoulders of the 
international agency which has supported them since 1948.”53 Simultaneously, they stated that 
“...if we did so, we feel that we are implementing the plan of Israel.”54 The ongoing dispute of 
Palestinians’ right to tawṭīn, naturalization, is deadlocked. The argument to withhold rights is 
fourfold; 55 economic: Lebanon is a small country with limited resources; political / historical: 
Lebanon feels it has already suffered a great burden and blames the Palestinians for much of 
the grievances; original intent: the refugees were to be temporary, and lastly, demographic: the 
tawṭīn of several 100,000 Palestinians would upset the delicate confessional balance based on 
sectarian demography (real or assumed). This fear manifests itself primarily with Christian 
groups, who have demographically already lost power.
 Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah has always voiced support for the Palestinian cause, and 
‘voiceless’ Palestinian groups have formed alliances with the party, who provides support to 
residents within selected refugee camps. Nasrallah has shown restraint from becoming 
engaged in conflicts between Palestinian factions and internal or external forces, as in Nahr 
al-Bared or ‘Operation Cast Lead’, Israel’s war on Gaza in December 2008/January 2009. The 
Israeli operation was thought to have wrought a reaction from the Party, but did not happen, 
albeit the Hamas representative in Lebanon told me that the “relations between Hizbullah and 
Hamas are good.”56 Hizbullah supports the moral right to return and the freedom of 
Jerusalem, although Nasrallah’s political ambitions within Lebanese politics reveal that his 
stance towards the Palestinians is far more Machiavellian and subtle than al-Hariri Junior’s 
blatant fear policies. He assumes that a new aggression from Israel will be launched:
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" ...maybe after 10 years, 20 years, 30 years, Allah knows best. Is it possible anyone can 
 take an oath and say a war on Lebanon will never happen?57
  In 2009, Nasrallah stated that the Lebanese people only had two choices: to surrender, 
or prepare for war. The first option, to surrender, would involve “great disadvantages” and 
“high risk.” It would also involve disarmament, as Israel would not accept armed resistance in 
Lebanon, and as Israel has declared itself a ‘Jewish State’, it will claim the naturalization of 
the Palestinians in the countries where they are refugees. Other “endless conditions” and 
“security commitments,” along with the water resource crisis, will arise, deeming:
 ً ادراو r;# اsoو و$9#ا عوA6, و$9#ا ةدارD و$9#ا طوA6# م_`Fguا .o لو>ا ر&;d#ا ًاذإ
	
 “If the first choice is to surrender to the conditions of the enemy, the will of the 
 enemy, and the project of the enemy, this is not going to happen.”58
  Following the expulsion of Palestinians from Libya in 1998, the Lebanese politicians 
held a stringent line, denying all entry of Palestinians, despite it being a pressing humanitarian 
crisis. They were afraid that opening the borders would admit up to 15,000 refugees. The 
debate within the country was heated, prompting one minister to state that “Lebanon would 
not become a dumping ground for human waste” (nufāyāt bashariyya). This reference is a 
comparison to the “expulsion from Libya and that of illegal dumping of toxic waste by certain 
right-wing militias during the Lebanese civil war, which was cause célèbre in the Lebanese 
press at roughly the same time.”59 Comparing toxic waste (nufāyāt sāmma) with human waste 
(nufāyāt bashariyya) demonstrated that Lebanon had already been “dumped on” enough by 
the International Community, and specifically the UN.
" During the 1980s, Syria’s interest in Lebanon deepened, based on the possible 
retrieval of the Shebaa Farms in the South and the Golan Heights, backed by the UN, and the 
overall wish to “take back” Lebanon, which they still considered a part of Syria. The Syrians 
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witnessed a diplomatically and tactical breakthrough60 in 1987 when Prime Minister Selim al-
Hoss and his cabinet requested Syrian troops into West Beirut to control the feuding militias. 
President Assad stated: “We were invited, we will stay until confessionalism is replaced and 
when stability prevails.” Syria’s interest in Lebanon resulted in an almost 30-year 
‘occupation’ of the country, bolstered by between 15,000 and 40,000 troops, intelligence and a 
vast corruption network, characterized by an outright dominance during the 1990s. The 
agreement covered, among other things, the establishment of social relations between 
Lebanon and Syria, epitomized by a statement in the Lebanese press by the security chief of 
the Syrian troops, Ghāzī Kanʿān: 
Create light industries. Engage in trade and commerce. Indulge in light media, 
which does not affect security. Shine all over the world by your inventiveness, 
and leave politics to us. Each has his domain in Lebanon; yours is trade; ours, 
politics and security.61
 Damascus and President Hafez al-Assad controlled much of Hizbullah, exploiting 
their leaders to create domestic popularity and a strategic alliance with Iran, based on their 
mutual support for Hizbullah.62 The United States was willing to live with Syrian occupation, 
as long as it maintained peace in the region. Syria and Lebanon became interdependent in all 
aspects, their economies intermeshed with each other on various levels. Approximately 
300,000 Syrian workers live in Lebanon, and that number more than doubles during large-
scale construction projects, for example, after the civil war and the 2006 war with Israel. 
Major trade routes go through Damascus, approximately 35 percent of Lebanese exports.63 
Equally important, Syria is dependent on Lebanese banking services, especially following 
U.S. economic sanctions on the country. The two economies are both characterized as ‘crony 
capitalism,’ an informal power system based on corruption and bribery. The system favors 
businesses and politicians based on sectarian and family ties instead of establishing a strong 
state institution:
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Society is hopelessly fragmented along clan, family, regional, social and 
ideological lines; there are no genuinely sovereign, credible and strong state 
institutions; and above all, a corrupt patronage system has created vested 
interests in perpetuating both sectarianism and a weak central state.64 
 The concept of patronage is alive and thriving in contemporary Lebanon. A person’s 
identity is not defined by being a citizen of a state with equal rights, or by education or ability. 
Rather, it is dependent on who knows whom, on owing favors and services, and buying 
others’ loyalty. In a comment posted on the NowLebanon’s blog by Angie Nasser on 
September 8, 2010, she says: “You are not protected by laws, you are protected by guns. You 
are not protected by parties, you are protected by militias. You are not protected by politicians 
who believe in real change.”
 In this case, Lebanon is a failing state. With the administration effectively paralyzed, 
most ‘Beirutis’ have resorted to a kind of traditional feudalism, taking their problems to 
powerful local families. In (Rafiq) Hariri's time, these feudal families lowered their profile, as 
Timur Goksel said in 2008: “But in the absence of the state, in the vacuum, we went back to 
our good old ways. The country is really running by itself.”65
" The signing of the Document of National Reconciliation (ttifāqiyyat al-Ṭāʾif), known 
as the Ṭā‛if Agreement,66 in 1989, ended the 15-year civil war in Lebanon. The United States 
acceded to be a part of the ambiguous agreement, hoping to end the hostilities and turn all 
attention towards establishing a peace process to finally end the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Ironically, this gave Syria the necessary conditions President Assad needed to sustain 
Hizbullah’s jihād against Israel in Southern Lebanon and continue its disruption of the same 
peace process.67 The challenge was to decipher whether the agreement is a “settlement that 
ensures the final and definitive resolution of the Lebanese conflict,” or simply a pact, as 
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Lebanese scholar Krayem states.68 Ṭā‛if provided Arab and American support for Syrian 
hegemony covering Lebanon, except for territory in the South overlaid by Israel’s army and 
its Lebanese surrogates, the SLA. Paragraph 3 states the desired liberation of Israeli occupied 
ground:
 :#و$#ا ةد&;g {`=و H1;OاAgDا ل_FQuا k% :;Z&/31#ا HYارuا V;5M A8A<F# :%ز_#ا تاءاAMuا :I&] ذ&d[ا -ج
 د.Mو J;G$[ S1G !59#او &;#ود &E= فAF9,ا :;Z&/31#ا دو$<#ا :+i/% HI HZ&/31#ا h;0#ا A6Zو &E;Yارا V;5M S1G
 راA+Fguاو k%uا ةد.9# :?AN#ا :Q&[uو H1;OاAgDا ب&<`Zuا m%~F# HZ&/31#ا ب./0#ا HI :;#و$#ا ئرا.i#ا تا.R
.دو$<#ا :+i/% S#إ
Taking all necessary steps to liberate all the Lebanese territories from the 
Israeli occupation, to spread state sovereignty over all the territories, to deploy 
the Lebanese army in the internationally recognized border area, making 
efforts to reinforce the presence of the the international emergency forces in 
South Lebanon to ensure Israeli withdrawal and to provide the opportunity for 
the return of security and stability to the border area.69
 The initial intent in 1989 was already to work to deploy the LAF to the South, 
marking state sovereignty against foreign aggression. It’s fundamental task was described as 
follows:
 Aid#ا ى$9F8 &%$/G م&9#ا م&/#ا :8&5Q ةروAx#ا $/Gو kP.#ا kG ع&I$#ا Ho :<1`,ا تا.+1# :;g&g>ا :5E,ا نا
.\F0#&9% S1G &o$Qو H1Bا$#ا k%uا ى.R ةر$R
 The fundamental task of the armed forces is to defend the homeland and if necessary 
 to protect order when the danger exceeds the capability of the Internal Security Forces 
 to intervene on their own.70
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 All militias were to be disarmed within six months, which did not happen. UNIFIL 
continued its “ineffectual truce watch”, while cross-border rockets between Hizbullah and 
Israel ceased to quiet down and the United States’ “calls for democracy and free markets 
camouflages its policy of a weak but stable Lebanon.” 71 Lebanese society entered post civil-
war torn between two daunting challenges: the withdrawal of foreign military or reforming 
the government. One paralyzed the other, whilst Hizbullah had free reign in the South.
 The civil war in Lebanon may have radicalized Shiite politics, but the importance of 
the civil war regarding Hizbullah’s development into a mainstream political party in 
Lebanon’s post-war political order is of equal importance. The party made the move slowly 
and consciously. Both parties involved had to accept the other’s legitimacy, as difficult as that 
might be practically or ideologically. This meant that the Lebanese government (mainly anti-
Syrian, pro-Western Sunni) would have to accept Hizbullah’s alliance with Iran and close 
coordination with Syria, and that the Southern borders would be off-limits to the Lebanese 
Army. Hizbullah’s leaders, on the other hand, had to cooperate with a secular government, 
instead of the religious ideology to overthrow it.72 They were to be in opposition to the sitting 
government, but a ‘loyal’ opposition with a resistance wing. Despite this turn away from the 
‘Open Letter’ rhetoric, they were able to retain the support of the true believers, those who put 
the ideological purity and principle above the demands of practical politics.73 This was 
possible due to the ongoing holy war on Israel and respect for the clergymen in command, 
who maintained the Islamic credentials from the Najaf religious seminary in Iraq and the 
geopolitical factors in the area, which deemed the party a fighting resistance against 
imperialism.
 The ‘strategic decision’74 to participate in parliamentary elections was as an official 
“instrument” for change.75 The organization resorted to a peaceful political process to obtain 
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its goals, which were becoming increasingly national and less ideological in nature.76 
Hizbullah’s legitimacy is supported by most of the Arab world, including the Lebanese 
government, as a resistance movement to occupation. In the first elections after the Civil War 
in 1992, Hizbullah ran in the elections and experienced a landslide win of seats in Parliament, 
while all 68 percent of the public said they would elect a member of the opposition. Secretary 
General Mussawi was assassinated on the cusp of the elections, and since then, Hizbullah’s 
Secretary General has been the eloquent, charismatic Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah. The 1992 
election program is often rendered in appendixes and references, along with the 1996 
program. The program was phrased to the oppressed Lebanese; it was easier to swallow for 
the opposing parties and summed up the political objectives of the opposition well: 
Resistance, abolishing political sectarianism, amending the electoral law (widest possible 
electoral base), political media freedoms, reform within education and culture, administration, 
developmental infrastructure and social securities.77
 Geopolitical tensions in the region and vital factors within Israel resulted in the final 
Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon in 2000, in accordance with Resolution 425. A UN 
special envoy was sent to Lebanon, led by Terje Roed-Larsen, to discuss the technical issues. 
A cartographical map was drawn up, defining a border line. It became UNIFIL’s responsibility 
to hold this line, dubbed ‘the Blue Line.’ UNIFIL deployed into the previous occupied 
territories, and the withdrawal turned into a major ‘victory’ for Hizbullah and its standing 
among its constituents, all of Lebanon and all over the Arab and Islamic world. The Lebanese 
Army also deployed to the South, asserting Lebanese sovereignty for the first time in 30 
years.  Following June 2000, the UN claimed Israel had followed up on UNSC Resolution 
425, a claim to which Hizbullah objected. UNIFIL remained as a buffer force between the two 
states which were still officially in a state of war. Hizbullah was effectively becoming 
prominent within the opposition, its social service institutions were being perfected, and its 
latest victory (naṣr) proved it was a success.
 Syria began to lose footing in Lebanon, and its relationship to Hizbullah turned to a 
“more” equal partnership. Two key factors shaped Syria’s new role in Lebanon; first, the 
ascendance of Hizbullah into the political arena was the first alternate power to gain 
popularity, which was not previously involved in these corrupt networks, second is the Syrian 
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withdrawal according to UN Resolution 1559 in the spring of 2005, following the 
assassination of the anti-Syrian former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri. Despite the UN 
eviction order and withdrawal of 30,000 troops, Syria’s long-standing political, economic and 
social ties to Lebanon still constitute a vast network of influence.78 The Syrians have played a 
key role in the shipping of arms from Iran to Hizbullah across the borders and will continue to 
do so in the future. According to American researchers, Syria will most likely work against 
the establishment of a strong, democratic government in Lebanon, relying on Hizbullah to 
protect its interests and its networks of patronage and corruption.79
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II.  ةر()  Revolution
" The Cedar Revolution (Thawrat al-Arz) was a term coined by the United States, 
imitating the prior color revolutions that occurred in Georgia, Iraq and the Ukraine. It 
described the political situation leading to the massive demonstrations in Beirut following the 
Sunni businessman and ex-Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri’s assassination in February 2005. 
Prominent journalist, anti-Syrian campaigner and democracy advocate Samir Kassir preferred 
to call it the ‘Independence Uprising’ (intifāḍat al-istiqlāl) to better affiliate it with the Arab/
Palestinian cause and to give it a ‘liberation’ focus. In June 2005, Kassir himself was victim to 
the string of assassinations that followed al-Hariri’s,80 which was widely blamed on an 
increasingly pressured Syrian regime. The Mehlis report was blamed by the opposition as 
“being used as a pretext to chastise Syria for a crime in which it has not so far been implicated 
and as a means of punishing it for strategic and political choices it has made.”81
 The al-Hariri empire has had already begun to rot from within, due to a vexed 
population, widespread corruption, large spending associated with al-Hariri’s reconstruction 
program putting the country in high debt, Syrian control, and close-knit ties with the Saudis. 
Syrians had, as mentioned above, gerrymandered the elections in 1996 and 2000, allowing 
limited representation of the anti-Syrian opposition. In addition, Syrian and Lebanese 
intelligence services still controlled large aspects of public and political life. The pro-Western 
Hariri coalition movement returned to the limelight on February 14, 2005, when the ex-
president was assassinated along with 22 others in his cortège and a random passersby of the 
massive car bomb. The scene occurred right below Hariri’s monumental reconstruction 
project downtown, the recreational area Solidère, not far from the seafront Corniche.
 The event prompted the country to go into mourning. The symbology flourished, 
people were uniting across sects and divides, and weeping at Hariri’s memory. That he was 
simply a finance tycoon billionaire with ties to Saudi Arabia was forgotten, although not for 
long. The “joyous” mourning took an abrupt turn as the opposition, headed by Hizbullah, 
AMAL and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) organized an astounding 
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demonstration in downtown Beirut, on Martyrs Square on March 8. This demonstration 
collected thousands of supporters, who, in a peaceful manner, thanked the Syrians for their aid 
in the resistance against Israel. The pro-governmental bloc arranged a counter-demonstration 
on the 14th of March. Dubbed the March 14 bloc, they blamed Hariri’s assassination on Syria, 
and demanded its immediate withdrawal from Lebanon. These terms are now all but spent.  
March 14 and ultimately al-Hariri Junior’s Future Party (al-Mustaqbal) had not moved 
beyond their parochial, sectarian rhetoric since UN-enforced Syrian withdrawal in May 2005. 
Their promises to ‘build a strong state’ ring hollow, as the State continues to neglect the 
South, when it comes to both compassion and services.82
 In May, as the alliances in the political sphere in Lebanon polarized again, the first 
elections to be held without a Syrian presence were won by the Hariri coalition. The 
Resistance, mainly AMAL and Hizbullah, politically cooperated in a joint opposition bloc. 
This gave Hizbullah almost 11 percent of the parliamentary seats. The election’s second round 
in the South showed an almost 55 percent voting turnout, opposed to 28 percent in Beirut. As 
AMAL leader and speaker Nabih Berri expressed: “The area has declared clearly and before 
international observers, it’s backing for the resistance as a path for the past, present and 
future.”83
 Jerusalem Day (Al-Quds) was originally used by Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini as an 
annual reminder of the future liberation of Jerusalem. However, the 2005 October 
commemoration in Lebanon was instead employed by Sayyed Nasrallah to publicly counter a 
number of challenges facing Hizbullah. The most prominent was UN Special Envoy Terje 
Roed-Larsen, and his (Assistant to the Secretary General) semi-annual reports on the 
implementation of SC Resolution 1559,84 mainly concerning Hizbullah’s problematic 
disarmament: 
While the inclusion of Hizbollah in the Government and such recent statements 
by the group’s leadership underline the significance of an internal dialogue 
and of the possible transformation of Hizbollah from armed militia to political 
party, it should be noted that operating as a political party and as a militia is 
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contradictory. The carrying of arms outside the official armed forces is 
impossible to reconcile with the participation in power and in government in a 
democracy.85
 Using Sayyid Nasrallah’s speech, the quandaries Hizbullah has outstanding with the 
UN, and the United States, the epitome of the relations with the UN system, are exemplified:
 Larsen’s words seek to sow fear. It is very regrettable that Mr. Larsen’s role is 
evident. (...) Larson is the new high commissioner who carries the 1559 sword 
and uses it to chase after the Lebanese, the Palestinian, and the Syrian 
authorities.86
 All of the demands on the Lebanese government by Terje Roed-Larsen are simply 
demands by Israel, Nasrallah stressed again in August (27), 2006. Larsen’s star role in the 
Oslo Accords was also seen as pro-Israeli, and the general mood surrounding the Security 
Council's Special Representative for the implementation of Resolution 1559 is one of disdain 
and mockery in the South.
" In early 2006, General Michel Awn of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), who 
attended the March 14 demonstrations, signed a Memorandum of Understanding87  with the 
opposition, officially joining the Resistance bloc. Some points in the memorandum (e.g.,. 
anti-corruption reforms) merely restate positions that Hizbullah and the FPM have held for 
many years, while others were hammered out over weeks of negotiations. ‛Awn has received 
much criticism for his switching sides to simply gain votes, though the most avid supporters, 
and especially young students in the FPM, say he is the only real reformist among the various 
parties. The fact that Hizbullah could go into these agreements show its ability to be a 
democratic actor on a very pragmatic and flexible level, and it justifies Nasrallah’s answer to 
whether the party is Lebanese or Islamic: “We are a non-sectarian Islamic Party, and we are a 
Lebanese Party that is not isolated within the borders of this country.”88
39
85"Second Semi-Annual Report of the Secretary-General”
86 Noe, Voice of Hezbollah, 352
87 "Memorandum of Joint Understanding between Hizbullah and the Free Patriotic Movement," Mideast 
Monitor, February 2006, accessed November 5, 2010,  http://www.mideastmonitor.org/issues/0602/0602_3.htm.
88 Noe, Voice of Hezbollah, 183
Ḥarb Tammūz89 and the Aftermath
 The Lebanese government disavowed the war in the early days, blaming Hizbullah. 
However, as the Israeli response became disproportionately large in comparison, the 
government changed its orientation, accusing Israel of waging outright war on Lebanon.90 
Hizbullah was hailed victorious for merely surviving the IDF’s wanton and unreasonable91 
retribution for their much smaller scale border kidnapping. During the war, a majority of the 
Lebanese supported the resistance, 86.9 percent, and over half of the population believed that 
Israel would not be able to defeat Hizbullah.92 Nasrallah was quick to term it a ‘divine 
victory’ (naṣr ilāhī).93 This was a conscious, vital amendment from the use of simple “victory” 
pertaining to Israeli withdrawal in the year 2000.
 The strategic victory94 included massive damage on the Lebanese infrastructure. As 
the dust settled, this ‘divine’ victory was tainted by the ultimate destruction of mainly Shiite 
areas, dealing a definite blow to Lebanon, equivalent to $7 billion or 30 percent GDP. A 
substantial setback to a country barely treading water, paying back debt equivalent to 180 
percent GDP. During the 33-day war a total of 1,200 people died (almost one-third of them 
children), 4,000 were wounded and a million displaced. Over 130,000 housing units were 
destroyed, and thousands of factories, roads, bridges, major electricity plants and other vital 
infrastructure were also destroyed or damaged.95 
 Israel’s miscalculations were of vital consequence for the failed IDF invasion of 
Southern Lebanon.  Hizbullah, as a guerilla group utilizing classic unconventional warfare, 
surprised the IDF by using distributed maneuver96 techniques in Southern Lebanon. Classic 
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guerilla tactics are surprise attacks with no specific importance to geographical area, which 
was not the case here. Hizbullah had both the ability to attack using surprise guerilla tactics, 
and the ability to hold their positions, as in the infamous case of the symbolic border village 
of  ‛Aytā al-Sha‛ab:
 ء&+= k% JEF%$? kG اوA3G k8s#ا jZ&Muا m1gاA,ا ة&R_, m%و&+,ا k% د$G جAB ضرu&= ةا.ّ`,ا لز&/,ا m= k%
 !5<8 m%و&+,ا $Qا. ضرu&= &E59% ي.g HF#ا لز&/,ا ض&+Zا m= k% :;%_guا :%و&+,ا k% _[&+% A6G :`5B
 JE=Ao $9= m;1,ا ط&3x# .oو \;1G &/;#.Fgا ح_`#ا اso" ل.+8 .oو m;1;OاAguا m;1,ا ط&3x#ا $Qu :;R$/=
 HF#ا ت&IاA0# &= اوؤ&M &o&/5M&o HF#ا ة.+#ا ا.3<`;# ا.[أ &%$/Gو .ل&NPu&] y1R نا #&=ا uو ن.BA'8 Joو
 $5<#او ا.16I k"# &F;G ة$1= S#ا ل.B$#ا ةA% k% A]ا ا.#و&Q Joو ،&E/% :;+3F,ا ءا7Muا 9= نوAFgو ،&o&/EMاو
."^
 From among the leveled with the ground houses emerged a number of resistence 
 fighters to meet the foreign journalists, who expressed their shock to see 15 fighters 
 from the Islamic resistence alive in the ruins of the houses (most of which leveled with 
 the ground). One of the fighters, carrying the gun of an officer of the Israely 
 paratroopers said: This weapon we took from one of the officers of the paratroopers 
 we defeated. They were screaming, I would not exaggerate if I say, like children. 
 When they came to withdraw the troops we attacked, they came with bulldozers and 
 we fought against it (too). You can see some parts left. They (the Israely troops) tried 
 to enter the village ‛Aytā more than once but did not succeed, praised be the Lord.97
 The IDF had extensive knowledge of and full access to this area of only 900 square 
kilometers, due to years of intelligence and surveillance. Despite this, the IDF failed to 
engage Hizbullah on their own ground. Hizbullah was initially the defender, and the IDF 
became the Israeli ‘offensive’ Force, as al-Saffar, a Hizbullah media personality, repeatedly 
referred to them.98 Hizbullah used traditional guerilla tactics, which meant the IDF could not 
recognize their small fighting units, or single them out from the civilians, thus granting the 
Resistance the upper hand and the initiative for surprise offensive. This discord between the 
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strengths of defense and perceived offense existed on all levels of warfare: intelligence, air-
force, ground-force, political war and media. It was won by Hizbullah, and the IDF ultimately 
‘lost’ their incursion into Lebanon in the summer of 2006. 
 Speaking with al-Saffar in June this year, she pointed out that reports on planned 
invasions exist, that Israel used any pretext to initiate such a conflict, and that this war was 
planned by both Tel Aviv and Washington, awaiting the right opportunity. After the ceasefire 
was established, Nasrallah stated in an interview a clear distance from the “premeditated” 
theory on Hizbullah’s part, and his first public mea culpa:
 بAQ S#إ يدFg nid#ا :;15G ن~= ز.5[ .;#.8 11 HI :L,&= $Qاو  &/8$# ن&] اذإ H/;F#~g .#" ^ا A'Z ل&Rو
."؟8Ai#ا اso HI Hx5Fg y/] !o
":;g&;gو :8A"`Gو :;/%أو :;G&5FMاو :;R_Bأو :;Z&`Zإ ب&3g> HN/#&= &9iR j;M~g y/]" _O&R كر$Fgاو
	
 Nasrallah said: “If you were to ask me, if there was a 1% doubt on the 11 of July that 
 the kidnapping would lead (in)to a war, would I continue on this road?” He amended 
 saying: My answer would be a definite negative for humanitarian,  moral, social, 
 security, military and political reasons.99
 Nasrallah’s mea culpa at the time was merely the start of difficulties to come for the 
next few years. The war had ultimately undermined the fact that Nasrallah was supposedly 
too intelligent to expose Lebanon to violent attack, and the promise that the party’s weapons 
could deter Israel from launching a war were proven wrong. In Nasrallah’s ‘surprise’ at the 
IDF’s wanton excessiveness, he attempted to call on Israel to return to the 1996 
Understanding,100 regarding Israel as abstaining from hitting civilian targets in return for not 
firing from civilian launch sites. Despite widespread criticism, a poll conducted in November 
showed that an average of 64 percent of the Lebanese thought that Hizbullah had become 
stronger after the war (92% of the Shia, and approximately 50% of the Sunnis and 
Christians).101
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 Nasrallah knew Hizbullah would have to focus its energies inwards. It was clear that 
the next few years would be focused on reconstruction.  Jihād al-Bināʾ moved in the day after 
the ceasefire started. Bulldozers were at work removing debris and tearing down the buildings 
that had not been demolished. The administration already had clear insight into procedural 
needs and had mapped out the extent of damage. As Klaushofer wrote, they had done 
continual assessments and damage control since day one, to decide where to begin first “as if 
it was the most natural thing for a guerrilla group to do, during a war.”102 Allowing Hizbullah 
to be the first to administer humanitarian aid and relief is losing the central government’s race 
to win the hearts and minds of the population. Nasrallah’s speeches post-war were one of a 
national president addressing his people after dire conflict.
 Resolution 1701103 was an alternative to an international force mandated under 
Chapter VII by the UN.104 Neither the Lebanese government nor Hizbullah wanted to see a 
Chapter VII intervention, and even a “classic” peacekeeping mission required persuading and 
probing to convince European contributing countries to send troops on a mandate, implicating 
taking on a guerilla movement even Israel had been defeated by. Italy and Spain finally 
emerged as the main contributing contingents, introducing peacekeeping again to Europe.  In 
the midst of the war, Hizbullah quickly accepted Prime Minister Siniora’s plan, even though it 
included provisions – most notably, the dispatch of the Lebanese Army to the South – which 
the movement had long resisted. Then, reportedly over Syrian and Iranian objection, it signed 
on to Resolution 1701,105 which not only called for a bolstered international force and 
Lebanese Army presence in the South, but also reiterated the need for full disarmament of all 
militias. Hizbullah accepted a ceasefire despite the continued presence of Israeli soldiers on 
Lebanese soil, something it had vowed never to do.106
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 Nasrallah promised there would be “no armed manifestations at all” of Hizbullah 
south of the Litani River107 and reinforced the LAF’s right to disarm and detain anyone 
carrying weapons south of the Litani. This blessing in disguise is a characteristic guerrilla trait 
valid today: the difficulty of recognizing and deciphering who is a civilian and who is a 
soldier. 
."JEF<1gأ ةرد&'% HI <#ا \1I ،1`% d يأ HZ&/31#ا h;0#ا \Mاو اذإ" ^ا A'Z ل&Rو
	
 And Nasrallah said “If the Lebanese Army encounters anyone armed, has the right to 
	
 confiscate their weapons.” 108
 UNIFIL II arrived on the beaches of Lebanon in August 2006, fully equipped and 
mandated to disarm Hizbullah and handle the crisis. The newly enhanced mission is now a 
fully equipped, heavily armored 10,000-troop strong force with armored personnel vehicles, 
tanks (which are not in use) and anti-aircraft weapons charged with additional tasks and given 
new ROE. Resolution 1701 states one of the main tasks as assisting the Lebanese Army 
(LAF) deploy and take control of Southern Lebanon, south of the Litani River, prevent 
Hizbullah armed presence south of the Litani River, and it:
Authorizes UNIFIL to take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its 
forces and as it deems within it capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations 
is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind, to resist by forceful means to 
prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security 
Council and to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and 
equipment, to ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations 
personnel, humanitarian workers and, without prejudice to the responsibility of 
the Government of Lebanon, to protect civilians under imminent threat of 
physical violence. 109
 This has proven impossible. In reality, UNIFIL has no jurisdiction on the ground or 
among the locals. “Actually, nothing has changed except that UNIFIL now has better armed 
units that still won’t use their guns unless they are attacked,” as Norton stated in front of the 
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Senate Foreign Relations Committee in September 2006. “It would be unrealistic to believe 
that any contingent could disarm Hizbullah or diminish its appeal. If UNIFIL is going to 
succeed, it will need cooperation, not the animosity, of Hezbollah.”110
 Ḥarb Tammūz left the country divided in two, despite the fact that Hizbullah received 
widespread respect, even admiration, for its success in confronting Israel. Where much of 
Arab public opinion saw an unambiguous Hizbullah ‘divine victory,’ the March 14th forces 
sensed serious vulnerability. 
   A year-and-a-half political feud ensued in Lebanon, involving Hizbullah MPs 
withdrawing, sit-ins and massive camp-outs by the opposition, paralyzing downtown Beirut, 
followed by violent clashes between anti- and pro-government forces with strong sectarian 
overtones, car-bombs, assassinations and massive demonstrations. All brought the country 
perilously close to a breakdown into violent sectarian conflict. Two decrees pushed on the 
party, with the backing of the United States in May 2008, provoked Hizbullah to turn its 
weapons inwards. The official dictate turned a once highly effective private Hizbullah 
communications network pivotal in a war against Israel into a threat, overnight. The forced 
resignation of the Chief of Security at Rafiq al-Hariri International Airport due to surveillance 
cameras found on the runway for executive jets was equally provocative. Two main 
arguments present themselves as to the reason for such a push. Was it to test Hizbullah’s 
resolve or the resolve of Hizbullah’s allies: Syria and Iran? Regardless, Nasrallah knew the 
consequences of choosing to act, just as well as he knew that he would lose the faith of the 
people of Beirut, breeching his promise to never turn the party’s weapons inward. The pro-
government Christian militias the opposition faced on the streets of Beirut, could also turn 
against them again in a future war.  These groups have been supported as a counterweight to 
Hizbullah by external sponsors. All domestic conflict tends to turn geopolitical in Lebanon, 
dependent on who is sponsoring who, even though the 2008 violence was unplanned, Timur 
Goksel claims: 
Someone in the lower echelons was responsible. Opened fire, being hard on 
the demonstartors, hard for the army. It was not a party sectarian affair. They 
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were not trained. It was Sunday, the local command could not control the 
situation, and street dynamics took over.111 
 Retrospectively, Hizbullah responded in an utmost professional way, in control and 
calmly, and neither violently nor wantonly. The images broadcast by the media show smaller 
groups from both camps erecting roadblocks and igniting tires. The March 14/pro-U.S. 
majority suffered an embarrassing rout at the expense of Hizbullah-led militias in Beirut and 
the Shouf Mountains. Three hundred are believed to have been killed in the conflict. A Qatari-
led delegation came to Beirut to discuss a truce and to invite the parliamentarians supportive 
of a peaceful solution to Doha to discuss a new national unity government, elect a new 
president (the best alternative being Michel Suleiman, ex-chief of Army), a adopt new 
electoral law, and pledging to abstain from the use of force in political conflicts.112
 
 The Doha Agreement113 was passed in May 2008. Hizbullah received (as demanded) 
veto power in Parliament with one minister, and controls 11 of 30 seats in the cabinet. 
Weapons were hidden away, stores and schools reopened, and the Lebanese returned to 
‘normalcy’. The fact that the ruling political class again needed to undertake negotiations in 
another country in order to resolve internal political disagreements illustrates the core 
problem in the Lebanese political sectarian system 114 and the lack of national unity.
The Christian-Sunni national vision revealed that Hizbullah and AMAL could only be 
Lebanese patriots if they submitted to being marginalized both politically and culturally. Their 
insistence on representation in the cabinet, parliament and civil service proportional to the 
population, and using brute force if necessary, has been accused of being sectarian and having 
anti-national attitudes.115 Despite these fears among other communities, and despite strong 
international pressure on the government to disarm its ‘terrorist cell,’ Al-Saffar said in an 
interview: “Lebanon is Hizbullah, Hizbullah is Lebanon, up to a million supporters. This 
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resistance is the only resistance that can stop the Israeli aggression to Lebanon. The Zionist 
threat is a big threat.”116
 As-Saffar repeated the same opinions in a meeting held in Beirut in 2010: that 
Hizbullah has the support they need, and that they have faith in the support from Iran and 
Syria. People support Hizbullah for the weapons, with little or no faith in the LAF’s ability to 
resist Israeli aggression: 
Look, the Israeli entity we see as an enemy, now look, we have lots of issues 
between us and Israel. You cannot just disband, people will not let them just 
disarm. They do not feel secure and that the Lebanese Army will not be able to 
protect Lebanon from Israel. The people will never agree to let Hizbullah lay 
down their arms. Lebanon is a multi-cultural society, you cannot have just 
three colors in the Government to create a national unity government!117
 If the argument is that the people will not let the party disarm, several other important 
issues remain that could be resolved, removing a vital raison d'être. ‘The four bleeding 
wounds’ augmenting continued resistance are: Hizbullah prisoners, the continuous illegal 
Israeli overflights, the issue of unknown Israeli land mines, and occupied territories like the 
Shebaa Farms. Along with these, analysts fail to address the lacking protection of cross-
border water resources, the Palestinians, the long-term deterrence of The Jewish State against 
Lebanon, and most importantly, as Noe points out, “the key factor that will determine whether 
or not the removal of the four bleeding wounds provides a viable roadmap for Hizbullah’s 
normalization: a national defense strategy.”118 
 If these issues were to be resolved, how would general support for the party appear?. 
The theory that they would reach a critical crisis is now replaced by the fact that if they were 
to be resolved, the issue of national security would remain unresolved. This became very 
vivid after the May incidents, prompting an alternative view on the militant resistance, 
ensuing that if a real change was about to happen in Lebanon, “The U.S. should do everything 
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to encourage this process. It should accept a greater role for Shiites in the Lebanese 
government as long as Hezbollah agrees to start, however gradually, decommissioning.”119
 The tension between the Loyalist March 14 alliance and the March 8 Opposition Bloc 
remains strong. Street politics had already solidified Shiite support, creating a highly 
polarized post-war environment, where Hizbullah’s weapons were their best defense. There is 
little doubt that the Doha Truce averted a descent into the nightmare of a large-scale civil 
conflict that most Lebanese were dreading, and as such, was welcomed by all. However, there 
is equally little doubt that this truce represents anything more than a temporary pause in an 
ongoing regional war. The attempt to overthrow a Sunni government lost them many 
Christian and Sunni supporters, as Hizbullah more closely resembled a Shia rather than a 
national movement. This image was not necessarily what Nasrallah desired; he has repeatedly  
called on people to show restraint, worried that internal forces will bring the country into 
“undesired consequences.”120
 ،ط&3xZuا S#إ Jo.Gدأ ،!5<F#ا S#إ Jo.Gدأ ،ءو$E#ا S#إ Jo.Gدأ ،A3'#ا S#إ Jo.Gدأ ،س&/#ا S#إ ة.Gد ً&;Z&qو
 !'[ نأ ب.1i,ا ن&] اذإ ،ً&9NZ ي$08 k# A%>ا اso ن> ،عر&6#ا S#إ تا.Gد يأ V% راA0Zuا م$G S#إ Jo.Gدأ
 يs#ا {x#ا نأ $+FGأ ،:%."<#ا S1G ا.ix8 نأ س&/#ا ءuo k% ب.1i,ا ن&] اذإ ،y1?و $+I :/;9% :#&gر
 ن.YA9F8و JE[&RAP Vi+[ k8s#ا س&/#&= <18 ىذ>ا ً&3#&و ،ً&9NZ ي$08 k# #ذ k% A]أ !'Q اذإو ف&] !'Q
 نأ \3F/Zو !5<FZو A3'Zو نو&9FZ SFQ P&/,ا !] HI س&/#ا S#إ :3<% !"=و ةد.% !"= \M.[أ &Zأ .!]& &%و ىذ#
س&`Q فA#ا
 Second: A call to the people. I ask them to show patience, tolerance, endurance. I ask 
 them to keep discipline; I ask them not to allow being drawn out in the street because 
 this would not benefit them. If it was necessary to deliver a message, it has been done, 
 if the people had to press the government, the pressure was enough, and if the pressure 
 is more it would not benefit (anyone). It is the people who are hurt when they are 
 robbed, harmed or exposed to problems. I appeal with all affection and love to the 
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people in all regions let us cooperate, let us be patient and enduring, let us be attentive to the 
sensitive moment121
 The May takeover could be more a show of power, a domestic deterrent. Why else did 
they not finish their coup? If so, such a move towards being a predominant political actor is 
possible, even probable, although the choice between that and resistance will have to be 
made. Stating that Hizbullah will never abandon their Islamic ideology is naïve, as: 
Everyone promises never to negotiate with their enemies, but everyone has 
their price. The PLO promised to never recognize Israel. Israel promised never 
to recognize the PLO. And so on. While the PLO certainly didn't start off 
negotiating in good faith, the political process helped gradually changing their 
stated ideological aims.122 
 Hizbullah’s twenty-four hour sweep of Beirut has been compared to the Israeli 
invasion of 1982. This is condemning, to say the least, with all the horror that the invasion 
entailed for the Lebanese and Palestinians. It is not a comparable, but the sentiments 
prompting this sort of criticism from the March 14/Future bloc show the ongoing neglect of 
Southern Lebanon. Many voiced opinions that March 14’s terminology of “a strong state” has 
lost its content and rings hollow in reality.123 A recent clash between two individuals 
belonging to different factions got out of hand, apparently over a parking space. This kind of 
climate is prevalent in Lebanon today. FPM Michel ‛Awn claims the following:
Security between states is held by politics, but such clashes are often misused 
and exploited by various factions, both domestic and international. All parties 
and the Lebanese seem to acknowledge this, but very little is done to commend 
transparency or reconciliation, or public debate. (...) But why did the clash 
expand? When there is something prompting fear, the simplest incident in any
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peaceful village can make people take to the street while carrying arms. This is 
the climate in which we are currently living.124 
The lack of reconciliation is characteristic of Lebanese post-conflict mentality: “I do not want 
to talk about it. This issue is over. There has been reconciliation.” 125
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War of Deterrence
 The disbanding of militias as the civil war ended incorporated many into the army. 
Even though Hizbullah was allowed to maintain its weapons already in 1989, as a deterrent to 
Israel126, today a second major key to deterring Israel is national unity, as Nasrallah pleas:
 تاA[.F#او ت&%ز>ا k% جوAd#ا ،H/P.#ا k%&xF#ا .o بA<#ا V/58و &8.g \159Z نأ ر$+Z يs#ا HZ&#ا A%>ا
 بAQ يأ \ّZأ ن&/3# HI m;g&;`#ا ةد&+#ا !] k% َV5ِgُ اذإ اso ،ر."6%و H/Pو م_] .oو !;R م_] ك&/o ،:;1Bا$#ا
 ف.g ن&/3# HI H/P.#ا i/,ا .o اso ن&] اذإ ،&E3Z&M S#إو :%و&+,ا V% &9;5M ن."/g :%و&+,ا S1G :;1;OاAgإ
 kG P&/,او س&/#ا ل7G HI A"N8و ء&N9Y &/Zأ &/;I A"N8 .o ،joاذ k8أ S#إ &Zأ : لء&`F8و  H1;OاAgDا A/8
 . بA<#ا ر&;B ه$/G د.98 _I &;/Pو &/%&x[ ك&/o ّنأ $Mو اذإ k"# 93#ا &Ex9=
	
 A second thing that we can do together and that can prevent a new war is to achieve 
	
 national unity/solidarity; we can abstain from internal tensions and crisis. This has 
	
 been said and these are patriotic praiseworthy words. If this can be heard by the 
	
 political leaders in Lebanon in any Israely war against the resistance we all will be 
	
 together with the resistance and on its side. If this were the national logic in Lebanon 
	
 the Israely will look and start asking himself: Where am I going. He thinks we are 
	
 weak, he intends to separate people and areas from each other. But if he finds out that 
	
 national solidarity exists, he would not think of war.127 
	
 This famous speech from 2009, on the third-year anniversary of Ḥarb Tammūz, shows 
Nasrallah’s rhetoric at its best, speaking to a large crowd in al-Ḍāḥiya, (one of hundreds of 
Lebanon’s ‘ground zeros’) and broadcast on a large screen.
 وأ توA;= JFN'R اذإ J"# ل.+Z م.;#او j;=أ ![ n'+/g توA;= JFN'R اذإ J"# &/1R ز.5[ بAQ HI : \# ل.+Zو
 J[ر.'[و ن&/3# ب./M S1G &=AQ JF// اذإ ،ا$;M JEI &5] و$9#ا JENZ &%$Z .j;=أ ![ n'+/g :;=./0#ا :;Q&x#ا
 يأ n'+Z نأ نورد&R م.;#ا k<Z J"# ل.Rأ ، ن&/3# HI :8AR يأ وأ ن&/3# HI :/8$% يأ ا.N'+[ نأ ن.9;iF`[ J"Zأ
." .936F# :;1Bا$#ا :E301# تارو&/% .15G .Qور" ،:Q&`,ا دا$F%ا S1Gو j?&#ا J"Z&;] HI :8AR وأ :/8$%
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And we say to them: in the July war we told you if you bomb Beirut, we will 
bomb Tel Aviv, and today we tell you if you bomb Beirut or the Southern al-
Ḍāḥiya we will bomb Tel Aviv. We make it clear to the enemy as he knows that 
well. If they launch a war on Southern Lebanon, and they imagine they are 
capable of bombing any town or village in Lebanon, I say to them we have the 
power to bomb any town or village in your usurping entity and on the expanse 
of the area.128
 Nasrallah’s rhetoric has consistently matched its actions, Norton said in 1998, prior to 
both the Israeli withdrawal and Ḥarb Tammūz. History has proven many promises to be 
correct, and in such case, one should not take lightly Hizbullah’s boasted fire power range, or 
in this case, promises “that we have inaugurated a new era in which we will be bombed and 
we will bomb, we will be killed and we will kill, we will be displaced and will displace.”129
 The war of words between Nasrallah and his antagonist goes both ways. Israel will not 
willingly enter into a new conflict. Hizbullah will wait for Israel to make the first move. As 
Harik said earlier this year, “I think it will be Israel’s move next,”130 knowing they will 
procrastinate and acutely aware that the ‘home-front’ is no longer safe. This is their “current 
strategic weakness.”131 Neither will Hizbullah take the first step; the Lebanese have barely 
finished painting their new houses. Ultimately, this is “the war no one wants, but craves,” as 
Noe wrote in July this year.132  
 Aware of Israel’s ultimate dependence on the IDF, and concerning all aspects of the 
future, Nasrallah asks the rhetorical question that politicians, military experts and analysts all 
over the world are asking themselves. Does the Israeli government and the IDF have the 
strength and ability to eradicate the resistance in Lebanon? Nasrallah’s answer is, of course, 
no.133 This self-assurance of their ability to win the possible next war is neither humble nor 
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insecure, patronizing those who even dare question Israel’s 2006 defeat. The Winograd 
Report134 admitted to certain Israeli failings during the war, and the political environment 
within Israel is one of learning from one’s mistakes. Nasrallah is aware of this.
 اso .o &% ،م7E[ J# !;OاAgإ نأ نو$+F98 ن.#ا78 u k8s1# j8A#ا ،تا./g ث_q s/% ر&E/#ا HIو !;1#ا HI !598 .o
 ن&0# !598و 1`F8و \[uاA/Mو \[اد&;R A;8و ًار&EZ ً_;# بر$F8 تا./g ث_q s/% يs#ا مو7E% A;#ا A'F/,ا h;0#ا
 ! ؟!9N8 ن&] اذ&% A'F/% A; ن&] اذإ n;"I A'F/% .oو سور$#او A39#ا sB~8و ;+<[
 8A'[ HI :R$= كر&= ل.+8 &51% ،#ذ !9N[ نأ uأ V;iF`[ uو ،:8.R ن."F# ر&E/#ا HIو !;1#ا HI !59[ !;OاAgإ
 :;g&;`#او ة.+1#و :%."<1# ل.+8 \Zأ ًا$M Yاو ،.M ح_g ة$G&R ةر&87# .o&;/FZو .o joذ &%$/G م&8ا ة$G !3R
 h;0#ا اso ،h;0#ا اso ة.R S1G H/3% \1] !;OاAgإ :#و$# Hg&;`#ا !3+F`,او ت&Yو&N,او طوA6#او :8.`F1#و
!؟ة$8$M بAQ S#إ !B$;g n;] ؟ز.5[ بAQ k% جAB n;]
 
  Israel has been working day and night for the past three years to become 
 strong. For those who still believe that Israel did not lose the war it is strange what is 
 this victorious and undefeated army that trains day and night, changes leadership and 
 generals, and arms. Commissions are appointed and lessons are learned. And this is an 
 army that won. What it would do if it has not won?
 Israel is working day and night in order to become strong and it is not possible to do 
 anything but that. Like what Barak said a few days ago when he went together with 
 Natanyahu to visit an airbase. He says to the Government, military and politicians, to 
 the negotiators (working with the conditions for the peace process) that the entire 
 political future of Israel is built on the strength of this army. This army, how did it 
 walk out of the July war and how it would get into a new war135
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 Nasrallah rarely makes public appearances due to security reasons.136 During the July 
War, Israelis used this as an argument to prove that Hizbullah’s victory was flawed, since their 
leader was forced to retreat to a bunker and subsequently avoid the public in fear of being 
assassinated. Although this is true, Nasrallah still demands all eyes whenever he speaks. 
People of all sects, both supporters and non-supporters alike, in all regions of the country stop 
and listen when his speeches are broadcast. His genuinely supernal erudition and concomitant 
charismatic media performances enthrall the masses and is de facto able to have an impact on 
a larger audience, ranging from the pure aficionados to the commonly found non-members 
but faithful admirers of the Resistance. Not to mention that his speeches may be edited, in real 
time or not, to obtain maximal effect. 
 The party’s proficiency in the media was never more visible than the broadcasting of 
his first of many speeches during the July War. Initially, only a press conference was held the 
same day of the kidnappings, proclaiming the demanded exchange of prisoners. However, as 
Israel’s bombing intensified, the IDF’s fervent campaign became apparent. The need to rally 
the Hizbullah resistance fighters and raise spirits was evident. The July 13 live satellite audio 
speech was “...simply, a masterstroke of war, politics, and theater.” 137 He had previously 
promised the people surprises and announced they would begin momentarily:
Now, in the middle of the sea, facing Beirut, the Israeli warship that has 
attacked the infrastructure, people's homes and civilians – look at it burning," 
he said calmly, almost matter-of-factly. As he spoke, out at sea, an Iranian-
made C802 missile crashed into the warship. We could see an orange glow, 
like flares, shooting up from the sea to the sky.138  
	
 This had never been done before: moving the war into the media sphere of 
sensationalism, propaganda and, in the enemy’s eyes, psychological warfare. A snapshot of 
the bombed ship is plastered up on a large billboard as one drives on the Tyre-Naqoura Road. 
This kind of propaganda usage is just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to Hizbullah’s 
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greased ideological machine. Immediately after the July war, “Illuminated advertisement 
hoardings were filled with Hezbollah material. Each carries the slogan ‘Divine Victory’ in 
Arabic, English or French on a tomato red background beneath an iconic image of a man, 
woman child or a piece of military hardware.” 139  Hizbullah has always been the master of 
incorporating all events into their narrative of “matyrology.”140
 The party’s physical presence is not obvious to the naked eye, but they are ‘shāk al-
salāḥ’ (armed to their teeth141), as a university student was explaining that “everyone knows 
someone in the resistance.” 142  The Resistance paraphernalia’s omnipresence compensates. 
Every street corner and haywire electricity mast in al-Dahiyyeh and the South has its 
mandatory yellow and green flag, martyr poster or beaming oil-painted leadership portrait. 
Nasrallah rallied not only resistance fighters and Hizbullah supporters. He was also able to 
rally the Lebanese people. In the 2009 speech mentioned earlier, the Lebanese people were 
given two choices: the first was to surrender (which was not even worth mentioning), and the 
second was ‘war preparation’ to avoid conflict:
 ،بA<#ا ع.Rو V/5/# ة.+#ا A?&/G ز79Zو $9F`Z نأ HZ&#ا ر&;d#ا ،ًا$=أ ،ً&=AQ V/'Z نأ r;# ،HZ&#ا ر&;d#ا
 m;Z&/31] &Zو&9[ اذإ ،A;3]و ي.R ل&5FQا ك&/o ،J9Z ،J"3;Mأ ؟بA<#ا ع.Rو V/5Z نأ V;iF`Z !o H# ن.#.+Fg
 k k% و$9#ا V/, ً&8.g !59Z نأ .o HZ&#ا ر&;d#ا ًاذI .ن&/3# S1G ً&=AQ k6[ نأ k% !;OاAgإ  V/5Z نأ V;iF`Z
 V/'Z نأ k"58 n;] .HZ&#ا ر&;d#ا اso ،&E;I A'F/Z نأ ة$8$M ً&=AQ k اذإ k"#و ،ن&/3# S1G ة$8$M بAQ
 A"N8 نأ k% و$9#ا V/5Z نأ V;iF`Z !o .J9Z ؟ن&/3# S1G بAQ k k% و$9#ا V/5Z نأ V;iF`Z !o ؟HZ&#ا ر&;d#ا
. !59#&= &5Zإو H/5F#&= r;# ،!59Z نأ &/;1G k"# ،J9Z ؟ن&/3# S1G بA<#&=
The second choice, is not to stage a war, by all means, the second choice is we 
get ready and strengthen out power elements to prevent (the occurrence of) the 
war. You ask me is it possible to prevent (the occurrence of) a war? I answer 
you, yes, there is a strong probability, and if we cooperate as Lebanese 
(people) we are able to prevent Israel from launching a war on Lebanon. So, 
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the second choice is to work together to stop the enemy from launching a new 
war on Lebanon, but if a war is launched, we have to be victorious in it. This is 
the second choice, how may we make initiate the second choice? Is it possible 
for us to prevent the enemy from launching a war on Lebanon? Yes. Is it 
possible to prevent the enemy from thinking of a war on Lebanon? Yes, but we 
must work, not wishing, but only through work/ action.143
	
 	
 This ‘action’ that Nasrallah rallies manifold is of deterrence and national unity 
state-building. Nasrallah has mastered the power of psychological warfare. He depends on 
Israel’s fear of human and economic loss as a vital deterrence pawn. During the war, 4000 
rockets sent over the border managed to displace half a million Israelis. This creates fear. 
Rejective of any sort of ‘normalization’ with Israel, Nasrallah prides himself that the ‘Axis of 
Resistance’ has brought far more results and concessions out of Israel than the group of Arab 
pro-Western ‘Axis of Accommodation’ leaders. Even though he propagates the notion that it 
is ‘better to fight and die with dignity, than live comfortably without it,’144 he uses rhetoric 
doubly, by at the same time rallying to deny Israel its war through deterrence.
   “We will turn any threat into an opportunity,”145 he has stated. Could these 
threats be turned to nonviolent opportunity? In 2000, Nasrallah reiterated that ‘normalization’ 
would not be an option, but that violence would no longer be a modus vivendi for them in the 
future. On the question of possible future settlement, he replied: 
 Of course the door would be open (…)we actually estimate that a  peaceful resolution 
is a victory for the resistance and its logic.146
 This ‘peaceful resolution’ of which he speaks is questionable. If taken literally, as one 
should with Nasrallah, such a notion could imply a settlement, if all the pieces were in place. 
These pieces are disputable. Which alliances would be most feasible, and would the Iran-
Syria-US be able to initiate it? It seems that Nasrallah is negating himself again, using 
changing polemics as a weapon of choice in this war of deterrence, to fathom as many 
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supporters as possible and continue to do the impossible: be a resistance and a secular 
mainstream political party, simultaneously.
57
Hizbullahʼs 2009 Manifesto
 In summary, Hizbullah’s foreign policy had not changed in its substance between 1985 
and 2009, and countries that deal with the organization should be mindful of this strategic 
continuity.147 Its ideology withholds such that “If any group today can claim the mantle of 
Revolutionary Islam in the Middle East, it is Hezbollah,”148 although its move towards 
domestic, mainstream, democratic, and political participation has become more 
accommodating in terms of lifestyle, politics and business. All the same, some party officials, 
as well as supporters, felt that Hizbullah needed to issue a new document that would provide a 
clearer and wider vision on the resistance and its current political work and future social and 
ideological plans. From the day it was promulgated, some have been advising the party to 
amend and ‘tone down’ the 1985 language, which reflects a different period of Lebanese 
history and international conflict. Others avert that we are still in the same period, only more 
deeply.149 Against this backdrop, Hizbullah’s seventh Party Conference drafted a more 
contemporary 32-page manifesto, reflecting 28 years of political maturity.
 Significantly, the manifesto, in Arabic called ‘the Political Document’ (al-Wathiqah al-
Siyasiyāh)150, which Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah presented in a speech in November 2009, omits 
the call to create an Islamic state, and recognizes that the Lebanese political system is the 
most suitable environment in which for Hizbullah to operate for the time being. The new 
ideological platform should be seen in the context of the group’s post-electoral efforts to 
reposition itself within Lebanon. Although the Hizbullah-led March 8 opposition forces lost 
the June 2009 parliamentary elections to March 14, the elections still awarded Hizbullah 
thirteen parliamentary seats and reconfirmed their political importance and popular support as 
a Lebanese-Shia armed resistance organization.
 In truth, however, this shift in domestic priorities does not come as a surprise to those 
who have observed Hizbullah’s political evolution over the past decades. As early as 1992, 
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when the organization first decided to join the political system and participate in the 
parliamentary elections, it had started to underplay the goal of creating an Islamic state, 
describing it as a long-term desideratum more than a practical, political objective and, in 
effect, recognizing that the political reality of Lebanon did not allow for the realization of an 
Islamic republic.151 Calls to reform and amend the political system do exist. The document 
affirms:
 Ho A5F`% !"6= \8$<[و هA8.i[و \Q_?إ V/5[ HF#او ،HZ&/31#ا Hg&;`#ا م&/#ا HI :;g&g>ا :1"6,ا ّنإ
:;g&;`#ا :;NO&i#ا
 The main problem in the Lebanese political system which stops reform, development, 
 and modernization, is the political sectarianism.152
 While ranking the abolition of confessionalism153 among its key priorities, Hizbullah 
also claims that until the achievement of this goal, “The consensual democracy will remain 
the fundamental basis for governance in Lebanon.”154 Their political role within Lebanon is 
more secure than ever, both through the National Unity agenda and the executive cabinet, and 
through the government’s guarantee that it would not (and cannot) actively pursue 
disarmament. The detailed four-part document provides many specifics on how Hizbullah 
plans to work with the new unity government to improve Lebanon and the lives of its entire 
population, intentionally staying within the realms of the ‘rotten’ political scene with an 
agenda to revise it, since the time to enforce a true Islamic ‘just society’ in Lebanon is not 
ripe.
 &/%$ّR يs#ا kP.#ا .oو ،:;[ا ل&;M>ا !]و د&NQ>او ء&/=>ا kPو .o &5] ،دا$M>او ء&=ا kPوو &//Pو .o ن&/3# ّنإ
 S1G m;Z&/31#ا !"# ه$8AZ kP.#ا اso .ءا$E6#ا ّ7Gأو ت&;<xF#ا S1أ \Yرأ A8A<[و \F%اA]و \[7Gو \[د&;g !Mأ k%
.JE[اء&i9=و JE= f568و JE# V`F8و JE/xF<8 ،ءا.g $Q
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154 " "
!#$%&ا ق$)*ا
Lebanon is our homeland and the homeland of our fathers and ancestors.It is 
also the homeland of our children, grandchildren and all the coming 
generations. It is the country for which sovereignty, might, honor/dignity and 
its freedom, we made the most valuable sacrifice and gave the most beloved 
martyrs. This is the homeland we want for all Lebanese equally – it embraces 
them and has room for them, and is proud of them, and what they give to it.155
 “In fact, Hizbullah did not – contrary to what several commentators have suggested – 
release its renewed ideological platform during a phase of weakness, as an ‘accommodation 
tool’.”156 As prominent scholar Berti assessed, the current situation is one of power, and this 
manifest reflects the organization’s growing understanding of international politics and 
reveals its attempt to employ terminology and notions that are commonly associated with the 
‘anti-globalization’ and ‘leftist’ movements, to transcend its national and regional boundaries 
and identify as an international movement.157  Sayyid Nasrallah addresses the West’s 
imposition on the Arab countries as US hegemony and remnants of colonialism.
 This universal war against terrorism158, he claims, is an attempt to remove the 
Resistance’s legitimacy and thereby seek to remove their fundamental right as a nation to 
defend their rights to live and national sovereignty. This is coherent with governmental policy, 
and not only the rantings of a guerilla leader. Sayyid Nasrallah is clear that the United States 
has indirectly created the Resistance, giving them little choice but to resist, at least if they are 
to have better and secure life and future. Future, build on brotherhood, diversity and mutial 
responsibility as reflected in the best historical traditions.159
 Renewed rhetoric in the manifest includes a few vital turnarounds on frequently used 
phrases such as the constant struggle against the Jewish State, stating “Our problem with them 
is not that they are Jews. Our problem is that they are occupiers who have usurped our land 
and sacred places.” Cambanis argues that even though the party has excised hatred of Jews 
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since the original Letter, anti-semitism does not distinguish Hizbullah. It has attracted 
supporters and poses such a strategic, theoretical threat due to the uncompromising and 
violent opposition of any peace negotiations. It is committed to destroying the Jewish State of 
Israel.160 Nasrallah “went out of his way”161 to call the Jewish State by its name Israel, as do 
other Hizbullah leaders. This sensitivity to public opinion is ultimately politically pragmatic, 
and observes that the resistance is against the Zionist Policy and not Jews or the religion of 
Judaism. Nasrallah contradicts himself, though, as was the case in an infamous speech of 
1998, where Nasrallah called Zionist Jews “the descendants of apes and pigs.”162 He had 
previously voiced a contradictory rhetoric, claiming: 
Islamic intellectualism and religion have throughout Islamic History never laid 
the foundation for a hostile attitude against Judaism and Jews. The war 
between ourselves and Israel is a war against Zionism and its plans, and not 
against Judaism as a religion or against those who believe in that religion.163
 This contradiction enormously complicates, as Noe stresses, any possible 
reconciliation or normalization between the two in the future. It could maintain a level of 
‘contained’ hostility, of permanent ceasefire on Hizbullah’s terms, but the rhetoric suggests 
that the skepticism of Judaism “may have run so deep as to become dangerously mired in 
what amounts to racial hatred.”164
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III. ت￿ا￿ر￿ا￿ر￿ق￿ Resolutions
Local Peacekeeping
 UNIFIL’s presence today is equally obvious to the naked eye, but far from subtle. The 
white trucks racing through traffic, standing outside the hip Costa coffee shop or parked at the 
Tyre Rest House165 is a reminder of the thousands of civilian and military personnel present. 
The contingents themselves do not live in the villages any longer, as they did in the early days 
of the mission. Now, they rumble through the streets in armored personnel vehicles on patrol, 
rarely engaging with locals on a daily level. 
	
 “You cannot do peacekeeping if you don’t meet with people,” Timur Goksel stressed 
in June 2010. “We asked our authorities if we could meet this new group called ‘Hizb Allah’, 
back in the early eighties. They said officially no; UNIFIL was only to deal with the official 
factions in the region, not guerilla groups, but unofficially they said yes. At our own risk. So 
we did.” 166 Hizbullah’s relations to UNIFIL have evolved from the Open Letters threat of 
dealing “with them exactly as we deal with Zionist invasion forces”167 to a more pragmatic 
side-by-side ‘We won’t touch you, you don’t touch us’ approach. UNIFIL has issued repeated 
press releases on how the enhanced UNIFIL presence in the South has a “positive(ely) impact 
on the local economy” and the approximate 40 million USD that has gone back into the 
Lebanese economy, increased commodities, tourism, medical insurance to national staff 
members.168 
 However, this is not nearly enough. In the time of crisis, the “first with the most” is 
often the winner of the hearts and minds, as mentioned earlier. Hizbullah’s social services 
section is already integrated into Lebanese society; the Lebanese Shia view Hizbullah’s 
services as an essential part of everyday life. This was one of the major failings in post-2006 
aid to Lebanon, as mentioned earlier. International aid was too slow and uneven in 
disbursement. Thus, Hizbullah’s organizations were more effective. U.S. aid after 2006 was 
$108 million, of which ten percent was direct to the aid of the government. The rest was 
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disbursed through NGOs, which does not enhance the Lebanese government’s capacity or 
legitimacy, but is the most cost-effective for donors. 
Nasrallah clearly spells out UNIFIL’s role in the South in the 2009 rally. This media uproar, or 
rather unnecessary noise, he claims are powers trying to amend the UNIFIL mission
 The Lebanese government’s ability to replace Hizbullah and become the “defenders of 
Lebanon” is highly dependent on taking control of the national borders and the full 
deployment of the LAF to the Blue Line. The mandate states UNFIL’s is to “accompany and 
support” the LAF, which has not been fully developed, trained or equipped. This would 
involve actual patrolling together, or at least in clear view of each other. As it is now, UNIFIL 
and the LAF have separate check points and patrols, and UNIFIL is at the mercy of the LAF 
in the case of any incidents. UNIFIL has also been unable to stop arms shipments from 
reaching Hizbullah from its main supplier, Iran. An arms shipment recently intercepted by the 
Israelis showed the massive quantities being transferred and that this apprehension was 
merely a practical ‘nuisance’ to the party, as they are already stronger than they were before 
the war in 2006.169 
 The fault lies not in the troops, but in the mandate’s incoherence with reality on the 
ground. Major impediments to following their ROE result in a classic Catch 22. The new 
engagement rules enhance military mobility to act beyond self-defense, but are denied in all 
circumstances by either requiring the LAF’s presence before engaging and the tendency of 
UN officers to first having their orders cleared with their national governments, causing an 
indirect chain of command, which is greatly complicated when the UNIFIL mission consists 
of so many multiethnic contingents. Thus, they are prevented from using force to implement 
their mandate, according to their own mandate.
 Despite these realities on the ground, and the ineffectiveness and unsuccessful 
resolution, the ‘traditional’ peacekeeping mission still withstands, and is improved since its 
birth in 1978. UNIFIL now has consent from all parties involved and has maintained 
understanding and cooperation from local civilians. This would not be the case if UNIFIL had 
begun to implement its mandate aggressively; it would quickly become a disaster “...because 
expanded peacekeeping missions are more robust and are usually impartial, they alienate the 
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local population and often make civilians hostile towards peacekeeping troops.”170 These new 
peacekeeping missions suffer from the same general problems, and tend to fall victim to 
following ‘template missions’, not a suitable starting point for successful missions.171 
Although Resolution 1701 is regularly criticized and violated on all sides, the parties involved 
continue to value the framework it provides as an “integral component of the status quo.”172
 Hizbullah is acutely aware of realities on the ground, as Nasrallah clearly states 
UNIFIL’s area of operation: “namely, to support the Lebanese Army and the Lebanese 
legitimate forces. That is all.” Consequently, UNIFIL “cannot erect checkpoints, raid houses, 
or search places, for that is the task of the sovereign institutions.”173
 Nasrallah was clear in his speech in August 2009 on the dealings of the international 
community to exploit incidents, to amend the Resolution into a multinational force, as 
proposed in 2006. Hence, this push collapsed due to Lebanese unwillingness to amend the 
mandate. A cessation of hostilities was attainable greatly due to the presence of UNIFIL II, 
but is now fraught with conceptual problems, after the 2006 war. The mission may be 
procedurally flexible, but without any operational planning, how the ambitious goals set out 
in the mandate are to be achieved, “The mission simply goes on in time and becomes part of 
the scenery.”174
 As Haenni said, “The Shia stick with Hizbullah because of the weapons.” Shia 
mentality has shifted in recent years from being marginalized or poor to being a political 
target, and “Being a target, no matter who the enemy is, makes you gravitate towards 
weapons.”175 Broad public support for the resistance far outdoes any faith in UNIFIL’s ability 
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to protect or prevent a future conflict; the same goes for the much respected LAF, who is too 
split along sectarian lines, to actually be of any use.176
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Foreign Intervention
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  No doubt, that the US terror is the root of all terror in the world.177
 U.S. involvement is of vital importance in the case of, if ever, a future conflict 
between the party and Israel erupts. Strong forces within the U.S. policy think tanks 
recommend supporting such a conflict, if it were to occur, to “break(ing) Hizballah’s military 
capabilities and reduce-(ing)e its political power; disabusing Syria of the notion that it can act 
in Lebanon to further its own interests without significant cost; and removing the potent 
Hizballah proxy from Iran’s foreign policy arsenal.”178 According to this recent policy report 
and similar other briefings issued from Washington, only successful IDF operations can 
achieve those goals and “Israel will most likely prevail in this scenario.”179
 The push to give the IDF both the time and political space it needs to carry out those 
objectives has been done before. In the last few days of Harb-Tammuz, the IDF initiated 
‘Operation Litani’, with U.S. blessings, causing unnecessary civilian loss and destruction the 
last weekend in a final attempt to subdue the Resistance. The obsession with Iran manifests 
itself into the conflagration of fear in the region in the case of a war.  Continuing along the 
neoconservative track as of late 2010, some are pushing to aid and support pro-Western forces 
within the Lebanese government to hinder Hizbullah in staging a slow coup of the state, and 
thwarting any attempt by Tehran to take advantage of the situation created by a Lebanon 
war.”180 Recommendations that “The US must demonstrate (that) it will use force if 
necessary” is most certainly not in the best interests of the Lebanese. Ever since the offer from 
Iran to negotiate an understanding in 1998, which included reduced support to Hizbullah, was 
rejected by the Bush Administration, the United States has been losing chances of possibly 
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building a better relationship with pre-Ahmadinejad Iran. Which may have been precisely 
what Bush's neoconservative speechwriters intended.181  
 The question Noe asks is “why the US approach to containing Hizbullah was 
ultimately so narrow and unsuccessful?” As suggested above, the last question is perhaps the 
most important, since it directly addresses what might have been done differently. On this 
account, several answers present themselves. Foremost, the United States consistently saw the 
issue of Hizbullah through a regional geopolitical lens that focused, sometimes exclusively, 
on resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. If Syria and Israel, in particular, could negotiate a 
compromise, then the issue of Hizbullah would most likely vanish – or top officials from the 
Reagan administration through even to the beginning of the G.W. Bush administration 
believed. This macro-diplomatic approach necessarily meant that robust methods of dealing 
with the party in and of itself were not as urgently sought as that they might have been in 
conflict elsewhere.”182 This is bestt exemplified by the Geneva deal that broke down in 1999 
between Israel and Syria, which might have brought Israel and Hizbullah to an agreement 
indirectly, although not promoting ‘normalization’, but a deal nonetheless. 
 Declaring a ‘war on terror’, and not exclusively on 9/11 perpetrators, wrongly viewed 
terrorism as a military problem, instead of one that is best addressed through patient 
intelligence efforts, domestic security measures, and quiet collaboration with like-minded 
governments. Hizbullah is not at the same polemic level as say Al-Qaida, as they place great 
emphasis on their political participation and do not solely promote pure jihadism and 
martyrdom without the accompanying respect and desire to maintain public support on a 
secular level. The party’s information and intelligence apparatus is extensive. The media and 
released information is followed closely, in English as well as Hebrew, along with possible 
sources of classified information from, among others, high-ranking officials within the 
American intelligence system.183
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 Moving from the current status of a ‘cessation of hostilities’ to a ceasefire seems to be 
distant. The UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon has raised this issue in meetings with 
Lebanese politicians and Hizbullah, and is quoted wishing it to happen by the end of 2010. He 
also added that the "three-and-a-half years since the resolution was issued in August 2006 
there has been remarkable stability along the Blue Line with Israel, contrasting with the 
previous 30 years when there was some incident every year.”184 The year of 2010 has not been 
without its internal challenges. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon was a hotly disputed topic 
from the start. The four years since its inception have been riddled with the “political rangles 
of setting up such a big institution”,185 in addition to its domestically debated 
unsconstituionality. The president did not sign on to the decree, albeit the majority did, and it 
has a braod basis within the Lebanese legal system. 
 At any rate, an unusual UN tribunal was initiated to investigate the assasination of one 
man, as oppossed to the other international tribunals, ie in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, which are 
open for all crime committed within a given timeframe. Several assasinations have been 
commited over the years, without justice. “One does not make tribunals for friends,”186 as 
Beirut journalist Nashabe put it.  This “unique experiment” is an ongoing point of conflict, 
which has escalted in intensity ever since it has been leaked that possible Hizbullah affiliated 
members could be indicted, already in March 2011. Nassrallah issued a speech in August, 
insinuating that Israel was inviolved in the al-Hariris assanination, pointing to drone video 
footage dating back to 1996. The statement cannot be seen as an accusation, more likely 
leading the focus away from their arms, and questioning the STL’s ‘justice’ as long as Israel 
was never formally investigated. He has aired repeated rallys to boycott the STL, and accuses 
it of being a hand of the United States and/or Israel, as the indictments now have possibly 
turned toward the party itself, Nasrallah has turned away from the will to call to legal justice 
as he did in 2005 and has opined a full boycott of the STL.
   Terje Roed-Larsen, SRSG, just recently termed this a “hyper dangerous 
situation”, in danger of escalating out of control. Storms or not, major forces of Lebanese 
political restraint are in motion, the first being the restraint the ministers and governmental 
blocs have shown this past year on multiple occasions that could have quickly escalated. 
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These incidents could all have been exploited, internally or externally, to initiate a conflict. 
Despite this, they did not. A major functional conflict de-escalation factor, which is seldom 
aired in the media, is the ‘tripartite’ dialogue that UN officials immediately set up following 
an incident, with UNIFIL top officials, the IDF and the LAF. These dialogues assess what 
happened, why and how to move on, avoiding one side being stigmatized or forced to seek 
revenge. 
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Epilogue
 “You want to know the future. Well, I do not see the United States or Israel in the 
region. Israel does not have the necessary means of survival in this region for more than a few 
decades, and those who live long enough, will be witness to that.”187
 Despite the prolonged ‘peace’ along the Southern borders since the implementation of 
Resolution 1701 in 2006, the situation has been deteriorating into a ‘war of deterrence,’ and 
the only aspect preventing a new war is the fear that the next one will be all-engulfing. This 
so-called ‘remarkable stability’ has been a time of rearmament, deterrence, posturing and 
weapons-cache building. The Lebanese Army has of yet to build up a decent base, and is 
dependent on U.S. aid, or other, possibly Iranian and French, now that the United States has 
frozen transfers to Lebanon. Hizbullah’s International Public Relations representative said the 
U.S. aid is “throwing ashes in the eyes. Real military aid would be anti-air craft missiles, but 
no one is ready for that. Especially since they will and can be used against the IDF.”188 
Deterrence is a method to maintain peace. Although it is not necessarily what Hizbullah wants 
in the long run, it is postponing a war that will be both larger on a regional and intensity scale. 
The reoccurring trend to view Lebanese conflicts as geopolitical in the region has funneled 
massive funding and an obsessive focus on the symptoms of the problem: Hizbullah, and not 
the root: the weak Lebanese government. Thus, the reality on the ground is a constant proxy 
to whoever sees it in their own best interest, in relations with Iran or Israel.
" The core reasons the civil war began are the same reasons that peace-building in 
Lebanon is so difficult: poverty, sectarianism and confessionalism.189 UNIFIL challenges are 
also rooted at the core of the UN political system, even though the possibilities for a 
containment policy without negating state-building or peacekeeping operations do exist. 
Numerous times, Nasrallah has opened for imaginative intervention on the part of the UN or 
the United States, and the ongoing hatred of being fueled in the South between Israelis and 
the Shia can be resolved using alternate conflict-resolution tools. As in any conflict, the 
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challenge is to think outside the box into which the parties have boxed themselves. 
Comparing the two, Israel and Hizbullah, it is tempting to claim that Hizbullah is most lenient 
to change and evolution in ideology, far surpassing the Israeli’s ability to reflect and alter 
strategy.
 The disarmament of Hizbullah is one of the chief quandaries. Hizbullah defines itself 
as a resistance movement, not a “militia” (as was stated in UN Resolution 1559), and it will 
not disarm itself unless presented with a “viable alternative to resistance.”190 The 
International Crisis Group has recommended that the various parties involved accept 
Hizbullah’s armed status and find ways to contain it instead. Hizbullah’s weapons must be 
dealt with in a way that neither completely ignores the problem, nor entirely resolves it. 
Disarmament is not an option. Some see their weapons as a shield, whereas others in the 
nation consider them a threat.191 Hizbullah will hang onto its justifications for armed 
resistance. Addressing the problem of direct threat: returning the Shebaa Farms, ending 
provocative overflights, land mines/ cluster bombs and the release of prisoners would indeed 
make their arguments less tenable, but the indirect threats are equally important such as the 
‘front of refusal’ which rejects Israel and all U.S. influence, and the endemic lack of national 
unity. Timor Goksel has added that if these problems were resolved, Hizbullah would find 
other valid causes such as water resources, as mentioned previously.192 
 .ن&/3# :8&5<# :;3os#ا :#د&9,ا &E;5`Z نأ j08 HF#ا :%و&+,او j96#او h;01# ، ة.+1# د.9Z
 Nasrallah, he calls the “Power-Army-People-Resistance” the golden formula that 
protects Lebanon.193 A mantric term, it has been used to praise the unity of the official 
Lebanese stance simultaneously incorporating all citizens into the resistance narrative against 
the enemy. This is masterfully clairvoyant of a future conflict, as Nasrallah senses the 
pressures being pushed on him will not be in the best interest of the Lebanese people. The 
governmental support for this tripartite cooperation is evident:
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\8أر ي$38 نأ \# <8 اsoو ك&/o N<F8و &/o ضAF98 k%
Today, we confirm the equation that secured victory: The army, the people and 
the resistance, as it was said by the ministerial statement and was reiterated by 
President Suleiman who expressed the official Lebanese stand in this 
statement… Suleiman conveyed his convictions and experience, while voicing 
the opinion of the majority of the Lebanese people because there is no 
Lebanese consensus over or against the resistance.194
  Referring to the Lebanese as a generic population, often in lofty terms of noble and 
the like, creates a general sense of belonging. Just like the confessionalist system, if there is 
no consensus, he then creates the reality to his best interest. Israeli scholars and analysts have 
also realized the ‘steadfastness’ of the Resistance speeches.195 
 These reoccurring terms are a trademark, and the continued exploration of Nasrallah’s 
speeches and statements would presumably shed even more light on a muddled view of the 
Resistance. Through the selected speeches used, it seems viable to presume that Resolution 
1701 is a catalyst to ongoing tension and deterioration into a ‘war of deterrence’ with Israel 
and governmental ineptitude in Lebanon. 
 These mandates must be rethought as soon as possible to hinder external players from 
“using Lebanon as the match to ignite a conflagration of violence in the region.”196 Resolution 
1701 underlines the need for “territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of 
Lebanon.”197 This requires a holistic approach. The compartmentalized nature of the UN 
structure reflects a view that the UNIFIL mission is separate from, and unrelated to, the 
missions of providing humanitarian aid or investigating the Hariri murder. These separate 
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institutions are all facets of a single state-building mission in the midst of an insurgency.198 
William Moony recommends appointing a Special Representative of the Secretary-General to 
Lebanon, encompassing all offices of the UN in the country, which would greatly reduce 
bureaucratic costs and enhance holistic operational planning.
 One of many required reforms for successful UN operations is greater knowledge 
acquirement, with a deeper focus on regional and local experiences, if the UN is to become a 
credible peace support force. Knowledge acquisition must be in focus, and all levels of the 
mission must have access to this ever-changing information at all times, to understand and 
monitor an ever-changing society.199 This is not years of study, Pouligny claims, but rather a 
collection of what all social sciences can contribute: geography, political science, economy, 
sociology, anthropology, psychology, and so on. “Locals are not passive recipients to 
international involvement; neither are they obstacles to successful operations.”200 Often, the 
importance of this relationship is underrated. The nature between the two is a decisive 
element in determining the operation’s success or failure.  A relationship characterized by 
mounting hostility, suspicion and lack of communication is sufficient cause for failure.
Without reform, the new robust force “will retain a major deficit that characterizes almost any 
international force, namely an endemic lack of local knowledge and language skills.” 
Enhanced and better equipped peacekeepers is not the answer. The conditions within the 
country that produce the Resistance should be addressed. If Lebanon is to avoid spiraling 
back to violence of civil war proportions, and if the international community is to avoid using 
sovereign Lebanese land as a theatre of war, as has been done so many times in the past, a 
new approach must be taken by the Security Council, and thus ultimately, by the United 
States. There is a critical need for fundamental political reform. The mounting differences and 
tribulations in confessionalism have remained unhealed ever since the civil war. The power-
sharing foundation should also be ratified. If not, it will result in “cyclic crisis, governmental 
deadlock, unaccountability and sectarianism.”201 
    Writing in 2009 on Islamism's victory, analyst Norell accurately 
forecasts the conflagration of small-scale wars. If these implementations are not successful, 
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but perhaps are the state-building processes necessary to create a strong Lebanese state, they 
do not negate Hizbullah gaining power within the government. He said the rise of Islamism is 
the use of ‘victories’ to justify the “armed resistance” and keep it alive and simmering.202 In 
this case, a future scenario cannot use the same logic that Norell claims the Resistance uses 
against it. There is a fundamental need for a clearer view of the Resistance. What are 
Nasrallah’s changing ideological priorities, as he moves further towards mainstream political 
participation, the more difficult his and the parties ideology is to define.  Hizbullah’s state-
building capabilities are at such an awe-inspiring level of success, being a state within a state, 
that all possibilities to slowly merge the Resistance into the army, and keep the party should 
be addressed sagaciously and promptly. Peace and conflict resolution theories built on Islamic 
traditions, opposed to Western secular rational thought, might be a tool to discovering the 
third alternative, the imaginative one. This transcends203 other options and is not based on 
compromises, but rather new ideas, floated on logic and imagination, and avoiding animosity 
due to resulting ‘winners’ and ‘losers’.
  There will be no sustainable peace without a solution that addresses the relations to 
Syria, Iran, the United States and Israel. Lebanon is a mirror of the region, in constant 
movement. Lebanon will most likely continue to survive the intrigue and ambition of its more 
powerful neighbors to the East and South, just as it has survived foreign interlopers for 
centuries. The Lebanese people must unite, collectively supplant the sectarian confessionalist 
government, introduce state sovereignty, and avoid sectarian provocations and incitements. 
Today, nobody can impose domination over the other, so all parties try to find outside 
sponsors: 
Boils down to accord between Saudi Arabia and Syria, then the Lebanese 
situation will be solved. We need the regional outside powers to agree. Israel 
would be happy if Lebanon was run by Syria. They do not care about 
democracy. They tried in 1982, they will not get involved in the inner politics 
(again), they are looking at the security angle, they would love to see the 
backside of Hizbullah, but the Shia community cannot be removed.204 
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The government of Lebanon should be bolstered in order to commit to welfare and extend 
sovereignty to the impoverished South and al-Dahiyyeh. A mental shift is needed internally, 
as Goksel stated in 2007 that many peoople would like to see Lebanon continue as a failing 
state, so they can continue to live their feudal, tribal luxuries. The state is only needed to issue 
passports, manage the airport and handle the money.205 
 Historical memories of injustice are inhibiting the Shia from moving forward; they 
need to be welcomed into the future governing of the country, and introduced into civil 
society. A direct connection exists between economic development and the armed resistance: 
the poorer the society, the greater resistance. One cannot coerce a weak state just recently 
reemerging from violent conflict into democratic governance. One must invest first in human 
capital, creating human and economic development.206 The current culture of peace and 
conflict resolution is mostly founded on human security, which is a vital element of 
intervention and crisis management, but moving on from this rhetoric is vital to avoid 
stagnation.
 Moving into a permanent stable ceasefire with Israel would be a first step, the 
resolution of the ‘four bleeding wounds’, water issues. This would ease anxieties on both the 
North and South front. People could continue with their lives, paint their houses, and invest 
without the fear of the next ‘hot’ summer. A peaceful resolution would be a victory for all the 
people in the region. It would be based on human security, sovereignty, and with time, a sort 
of normalization. The alternative is a scenario that will only create violence in an ongoing 
global war on ‘terror’. Make no mistake, they are all preparing for it, and Hizbullah will 
undoubtedly survive, but it is difficult to imagine Nasrallah justifying another disastrous war 
on the Lebanese civilian population.
 An accord between Syria and Israel is a key element of all proposed scenarios for 
Arab-Israeli peace. In exchange for returning the occupied Golan Heights, Israel and the 
United States will insist on the disarmament of Hezbollah. Although both Hezbollah and Iran 
still argue, perhaps correctly, that Israel will not return Golan Heights or allow the emergence 
of a Palestinian state, the possibility of peace cannot be ruled out. If it does occur, Syria will 
push Lebanon into a peace treaty with Israel, forcing it to adjust to the new realities.207
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 Given its popularity, Hizbullah will continue as an influential party, and regardless of 
the outcome or its international stamp as a terrorist organization, it is a vital, undeniable 
player in the future of a free Lebanon. Nasrallah has stated that “A peaceful resolution is a 
victory for the resistance.”208 Hopefully he is right.
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ABSTRAKT
  Dette studiet hadde som hensikt å undersøke utvalgte taler og manifest fra 
Hizbullah, for å finne freds retorikken, og en mulig fredlig løsning på konfliktene i Libanon. 
Det har blitt understreket, at det som tidligere var uoppnåelige krav fra Hizbullah, bl. de ‘fire 
blødende sår’: fanger i Israel, Israelske overflygnnger, mangel på kart over miner og 
klasebomber og den siste, okkuperte områder, selv om disse nå i dagens politiske bevegelser, 
kunne ha blitt oppfylt, gjenstår det en hovednøkkel til Hizbullah’s mulige avvæpning og 
overgang til å være et rent politisk parti; nemlig mangelen på en fungerende regjerning, og 
statens manglende evne til å yte forsvar og samfunnssikkerhet.
 Hezbollah’s General Sekretær Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah har sagt “en fredlig løsning/ 
resolusjon er en seier for motstandsbevegelsen”. Som med de fleste taler til Nasrallah, skal de 
taes med et klype salt, og alvorlig, simultant. Nasrallah holder som oftest det han lover, som 
kan sees gjentatte ganger i den siste tid.
 FN’s innsats og mandater i landet synes å være svak utrustet med lokal kontekst, 
uoppnåelige krav og fraværet av et holistisk tilnærmning. Til tross for stempelet som ‘terror-
organisajon’ er Hezbollah en relativ demokratisk politisk parti, en massiv velferdsstats 
institisjon, og en uungåelig viktig brikke i fremtiden til et fritt Libanon.
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